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d e a n ’s m e s s a g e

dear alumni and friends,

S

pring has come to Provo, albeit with some snow, and final examinations and
graduation will be upon us shortly. New graduates and students will soon be
heading off literally all over the world for jobs, summer clerkships, and externships. Most of us can relate to their feelings of anticipation, excitement, and
uncertainty as they embark on the challenges that await them.
I have always viewed learning the law as something like learning to speak a foreign
language. For the first few weeks of class, we can feel completely at sea and wonder
whether it will ever be possible to communicate in this new language of the law. Even as we begin to develop a legal vocabulary and to learn a series of doctrines and rules, we still struggle with how to apply the rules to a particular fact pattern.
We hear a story but don’t simultaneously see the legal issues, ambiguities, alternative narratives, and potential resolutions
to the problem described in the story. We read a contract but don’t understand the risks or incentives associated with particular provisions. At the beginning, everything is halting translation.
Just like in every foreign language class, most of us remember those in our 1l classes who were stellar law linguists and who,
for some reason, just got it. Translation seemed to come faster for them; their comments sounded more fluent; and, at times,
they carried on a conversation with the faculty member that made us wonder whether we were learning the same language.
But the wonderful thing about learning a foreign language or the language of the law is that both yield up their secrets
with enough effort. At some point we start hearing and seeing meaning without churning through a cumbersome translation process. For some this may come more quickly than others, but for all who are willing to work hard, it comes. Of
course we continue to admire the gifted law linguists among us, but once we learn how to speak, the real question is how
we use our language. Just like speaking a language doesn’t make the missionary, knowing the law isn’t enough to make the
lawyer. It’s what you do with the language and what you do with the law that matters.
For graduates and students that time is now upon them. Although legal fluency is a lifetime’s project—which is part of
what attracted so many of us to the law—I am confident that our students have all of the language skills they need to succeed.
Many of our 1ls will be putting their legal and foreign language skills to use in international settings. This year 48 students will do an international externship with placements across the continents in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Australia,
Europe, and the Middle East. What Professor Jim Backman began as a modest externship program in 1992 has grown into
a worldwide program with a remarkable breadth of opportunities.
Our 3ls will graduate and head off for jobs all over the country. Continuing in a long tradition at byu, in 2011, 12 graduates (a couple from prior years) will start in clerkships with federal appellate and district courts, as well as state supreme
courts. The geographical distribution of our graduates reflects our national presence. Typically, about 40 percent of our
graduates end up in Utah and 60 percent elsewhere.
Frankly, as is the case in law schools across the country, too many of our 3ls are still looking for work. In my conversations with other deans, I have sensed that we are comparatively well off, mainly because of a remarkable network of
alumni and friends who recognize the quality of our students. Despite our relative strength, an increase in legal employment opportunities can’t come fast enough for the students and for our Career Services Office, which has been working
overtime. In addition to increased efforts there and a job initiative in which our alumni have been helpful, last year we created a public service fellowship that provides funds for 10 recent graduates to work part-time in public interest and public
service positions for up to nine months while they continue to search for permanent employment. I appreciate the support
of alumni and friends to make this possible.
More than that support, I appreciate the examples of alumni and friends who over the years have used their training
in the language of the law to comfort, persuade, lead, and serve. As our students leave Provo and spread across the world,
joined by a strong cadre of students in the Law Society, I am confident that they will continue in this great tradition and
become not just impressive legal linguists but also committed practitioners of the ennobling work of the law.

Photograph by Bradley Slade / Map by Doug Thomas

							Warm regards,

							

james r. r asband
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Law and Becoming
by

e l d e r d. t o d d c h r ı s t o f f e r s o n
of the quorum of the twelve apostles

photo g ra phy

Th
e

fol
low
in

g sp
eec
h wa

4

s prese

nted at the ninth

c l a rk

Re
al J.
annu

m e mo randu m

by

bradley

slade

he Conference Center Little Theater in Salt L
eld in t
de, h
resi
i
F
iety
Soc
w
a
L
rk
Cla
n
e
ub

.
011
4, 2
ary
u
r
b
e
y on F
ake Cit

L

et me express, first of all, the honor I feel at being invited to address you this evening. You are
an audience of accomplished individuals with demonstrated commitment to what is good and
right. I appreciate your character and your good will.
It is also a great honor for me to be introduced by a man I respect as highly as Ralph Hardy. I
first became acquainted with Ralph in the early 1970s when Kathy and I and our two young children
at the time moved to Maryland following my graduation from law school. During my years in the
Washington area, Ralph and I practiced law together and served concurrently as bishops. Ralph was
kind enough to tutor me in things relating to the practice of law as well as to leadership in the Church.
I learned a great deal from his example that benefits me still today in my current calling and service.
Ralph’s intellect and judgment are exceptional. Over the years important political figures and
many others have come to rely on his wisdom. I know from personal observation how highly Ralph
is regarded among the senior leaders of the Church. His recommendations and insights are regularly sought and gratefully received. We all understand the thoughtfulness and experience behind
his counsel. I am by no means alone in my conviction that Ralph’s exceptional talent and devotion
not only do great credit to the legal profession, but, even more important, represent a tremendous
blessing for The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
Ralph, I am grateful that you would do me the honor of this introduction in your typically gracious manner, and I take this occasion to express to you publicly my deepest admiration.
I have titled my remarks this evening “Law and Becoming.” By this I mean to talk about the vital
role of law in what we may become. In speaking of becoming, I am taking the long view not only of
what a person may be able to make of himself or herself in the space between birth and death, but
also of the eternal potential of men and women. And, in speaking of law, I want to reference not
only matters of our codes and courts but also the laws of God.
Through revelations granted to the Prophet Joseph and his predecessors, we
learn some profound things about our relationship to God and our ultimate destiny. We learn that Jesus Christ, as the Son of God, progressed “from grace to
grace, until he received a fulness”1 and that we may follow in that same path. He
said, “For if you keep my commandments you shall receive of his fulness, and be
glorified in me as I am in the Father; therefore, I say unto you, you shall receive grace
for grace.”2 In explaining the natural conclusion of this pattern, Joseph Smith said:
Here, then, is eternal life—to know the only wise and true God; and you have got to learn how to be gods yourselves, and to be kings and priests to God, . . . by going from one small degree to another, and from a small capacity
to a great one; from grace to grace, from exaltation to exaltation, until you attain to the resurrection of the dead, and
are able to dwell in everlasting burnings, and to sit in glory, as do those who sit enthroned in everlasting power.3
Joseph Smith also referred to God’s use of law in this process:
The first principles of man are self-existent with God. God himself, finding he was in the midst of spirits
and glory, because he was more intelligent, saw proper to institute laws whereby the rest could have a privilege to
advance like himself. The relationship we have with God places us in a situation to advance in knowledge. He has
power to institute laws to instruct the weaker intelligences, that they may be exalted with Himself, so that they
might have one glory upon another.4
I cite one more teaching from the Prophet that adds the remaining element to this equation—agency:
All persons are entitled to their agency, for God has so ordained it. He has constituted mankind moral agents, and
given them power to choose good or evil; to seek after that which is good, by pursuing the pathway of holiness in this
life, which brings peace of mind, and joy in the Holy Ghost here, and a fulness of joy and happiness at His right
hand hereafter; or to pursue an evil course, going on in sin and rebellion against God, thereby bringing condemnation to their souls in this world, and an eternal loss in the world to come.5
All of this declares that we have a potential made possible by God beyond anything we can fully
comprehend or appreciate at present. And we recognize, of course, that none of us will achieve the
ultimate end, the status of eternal life with God our Father, in a matter of days or years or with-
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Introduction of Elder D.
Todd Christofferson of the
Quorum of the Twelve
by elder ralph w. hardy jr.
of the seventy

On the warm Friday afternoon of
September 5, 1975, my 30-year-old
law firm colleague, David Todd
Christofferson, and I found a place
behind the already occupied rows
of metal chairs and sat on the cool,
green grass in front of the gleaming,
new J. Reuben Clark Law School
Building on the byu campus. On a
sudden impulse we had caught a
plane in Washington in order to witness this historic dedication of the
new law school building by President
Marion G. Romney—and in the presence also of byu President Dallin
Oaks, founding dean Rex Lee, Chief
Justice Warren Burger, and Justice
Lewis Powell of the Supreme Court.
Even though we had studied law
at other distinguished institutions,
we knew that this was a seminal
event and the coming of age of a
law school that would forever add
definition and substance to our professional lives as well as strength to
the Church. Little did I realize on that
beautiful afternoon that I was sitting
on the grass with a future Apostle
of the Lord Jesus Christ, although—
already—had someone vouchsafed
that fact to me, I would not have
been the least bit surprised.
I first became acquainted with
Elder Christofferson when I took a
taxi to the United States Courthouse
in Washington to see this newly
minted, 27-year-old law clerk to u.s.
District Court Chief Judge John J.
Sirica. The famous Watergate case
was still in its infancy, and virtually
nobody knew the extent to which
that case would eventually go. I
was on a recruiting errand. I met
in the judge’s chambers with this
bright young lawyer with such a
pleasing countenance and easy
smile. Eventually I secured from
him a commitment to join my law

firm after what we both assumed
would be his one-year commitment
to the judge. I should add that, for
our firm, as you can imagine, Elder
Christofferson was a very big “get.”
In addition to his almost unbelievable clerkship opportunity with
Judge Sirica, Elder Christofferson
had been a byu Edwin Hinckley
scholar, student-body academic vice
president, an exceptional Duke law
student, and an editor of the Duke
Law Journal.
Nevertheless, with the growing
complexity and riveting national
attention on the Watergate case
increasing exponentially, the
standard one-year commitment
expanded into three years, and
Judge Sirica would call our firm several times to declare, regarding his
able young law clerk: “I just can’t let
him go—he’s too valuable. He’s the
only one I can talk to!”
During the long pendency of the
Watergate case, the Washington Post
described Elder Christofferson as
“a former Mormon missionary who
serves as Judge Sirica’s clerk and alter
ego” and added that “Todd, now a
tall, soft-spoken, blond-headed young
man,” had “served as a missionary
in Argentina.” In its “1973 Person
of the Year” cover story on Judge
Sirica, Time magazine illustrated
the exceptionally close relationship
between this judge and his law clerk
by observing that “while the technicians continued their studies [for
any evidence of tampering], [Judge
Sirica] and his young law clerk, Todd
Christofferson, listened to the [White

House] tapes through headphones in
a jury room.” Thirty years later I was
privileged to be in the completely
filled ceremonial courtroom of the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
to attend a retrospective on the
Watergate case that featured on the
dais many of the still-living lawyers,
television correspondents, and
defendants in that national drama.
What was most interesting was the
attention and great respect that was
accorded to Elder Christofferson,
whom everyone remembered well.
He was, as you would imagine, the
recipient of many questions—which
he fielded with his trademark grace,
humor, and good judgment. When
Judge Sirica died in 1992, the family
asked Elder Christofferson to speak
at his funeral in Washington. What
counsel would you have expected
Elder Christofferson, then of the
Seventy, to have given on that occasion? Yes! It was the doctrine of the
plan of salvation.
While residing in the Washington
d.c. Stake, Elder Christofferson
soon found himself called as a
bishop. Then, less than five years
later, he accepted an exciting professional opportunity as in-house
counsel to a health care company
in Tennessee. This was followed
by his appointment as senior vice
president and general counsel of
Tennessee’s Commerce Union Bank.
He was called as a stake president
in Nashville and, at the end of his
tenure, became a regional representative. Finally, in the rapidly

consolidating world of banking,
Elder Christofferson became associate general counsel of the giant
NationsBank in Charlotte, which
later acquired Bank of America and
retained that name. We all know
the rest of the story. The Lord had
already charted for this able lawyer
another long-term path. Shortly
after moving to Charlotte, he was
called, in 1993, to the First Quorum
of the Seventy and, in 1998, to the
Presidency of the Seventy. Then,
on April 12, 2008, Elder David Todd
Christofferson was ordained to an
apostleship. I have dwelled somewhat on the early judicial clerkship
of a young Elder Christofferson
because this unique experience—
occurring at the very epicenter of
perhaps the greatest American
political crisis since the Civil War—
helped refine the keen instincts,
exceptional scholarship, sound
judgment, and advocacy skills that
would enhance both his successful
professional career and his ministry. This being said, however, what
many in the world would not know
is that, more than any other factor,
Elder Christofferson’s mode of life
and careful approach to his many
responsibilities have been informed
through the tutelage of the Spirit.
Elder Christofferson’s best friend
and confidant (who is here with us
tonight) is the love of his life and his
eternal companion, Kathy, whom
he married in the Salt Lake Temple
in 1968. The Christoffersons have
been blessed with five children and
nine grandchildren. Throughout his
nearly 18-year ministry as a General
Authority, Elder Christofferson, with
uncommon, understated eloquence
and precision, has given inspired
counsel on many important gospel
topics. For aspiring and current
lawyers, however, his addresses
and writings have been particularly
insightful. This evening, J. Reuben
Clark Law Society is highly honored
to have the privilege of hearing the
instruction of this servant of the Lord
and fellow member of the bar.
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out substantial help. We require the help of one another and an incalculable measure of divine grace
originating in Christ and administered through the Holy Ghost. Nevertheless, our own choices will
always be critical to what we become. And the capacity and power to choose are, as Joseph Smith
declared, dependent on laws instituted by or under the authority of God.
Such laws link particular actions to fixed outcomes. If a given choice did not always and invariably yield the same result, we could not in the end control outcomes, and the power to choose
would be meaningless. And even with law, if we are not free to act, either to follow or reject it, we
likewise could not use law to progress from grace to grace. I believe that Satan’s proposals in the
premortal world attacked both of these principles. He wanted to be vested with a power of compulsion over the souls of men and with the honor or power of God:
And I, the Lord God, spake unto Moses, saying: That Satan, whom
thou hast commanded in the name of mine Only Begotten, is the same which
was from the beginning, and he came before me, saying—Behold, here am I,
send me, I will be thy son, and I will redeem all mankind, that one soul shall
not be lost, and surely I will do it; wherefore give me thine honor.6
Had Satan been granted power to dictate our choices, we would
have become nothing more than his puppets, eternally dependent upon
him. It is my personal opinion that in demanding “Give me thine honor,”
Satan was also coveting God’s power to establish the law, and that it was
his intention to use that power arbitrarily—to apply, revoke, and change
laws in an arbitrary fashion that would destroy our power to act independently and to choose our destiny. For whatever reason, Satan was exceptionally persuasive in lobbying for his approach. Happily, his plan was rejected,
although echoes continue to reverberate in the world around us.
The deities of ancient Greek and Roman mythology were often arbitrary beings. While they
were supposed to possess remarkable powers, they were ruled by their passions. As they fought and
jockeyed for position among themselves, or simply vented feelings of lust, anger, or frustration,
mere mortals were sometimes caught in the cross fire. We can be grateful, to say the least, that the
true and living God is nothing like the imaginary Zeus or Jupiter.
The scripture states, “There are many kingdoms. . . . And unto every kingdom is given a law;
and unto every law there are certain bounds also and conditions.” 7 Apparently, laws with their conditions and bounds may vary in different kingdoms or spheres—as, for example, the laws of the
several kingdoms that prevail in our postmortal life. The Lord says that His celestial kingdom is
populated by those who are “sanctified through the law which I have given unto you, even the law
of Christ,”8 and that those who cannot abide this celestial law must inherit a lesser kingdom whose
law they are able and willing to follow.9 While differing laws may apply in different parts of God’s
creation, the laws that do apply do not themselves vary. Such beings and creations as are subject to
them can rely on them to achieve their divine potential. We are told that those who are governed by
law are preserved, perfected, and sanctified by the same.10
Under the umbrella of divine law and order applicable to the “kingdom” that is our present mortal world, God delegates to us, His children, the opportunity and responsibility to establish laws
and legal systems to govern human relations and conduct. Let me quote from section 134 of the
Doctrine and Covenants:
We believe that governments were instituted of God for the benefit of man; and that he holds men accountable
for their acts in relation to them, both in making laws and administering them, for the good and safety of society.
We believe that no government can exist in peace, except such laws are framed and held inviolate as will secure
to each individual the free exercise of conscience, the right and control of property, and the protection of life.11
These standards—(1) that laws are to be made and administered for “the good and safety of society” and (2) that they must secure to each individual the rights of life, property, and conscience—
bespeak a legal environment in which man may progress toward his divine destiny, to become what
God has ordained he may become. They establish the stability, order, and means whereby each
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individual may exercise moral agency. They produce a setting wherein each person, if he or she so
desires, can “come unto Christ, and be perfected in him”12 and all that that entails.
In the infant days of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Lord expressed
in a revelation to Joseph Smith the wisdom and benefit of organizing the Church and its work
“according to the laws of man; That your enemies may not have power over you; that you may be
preserved in all things; that you may be enabled to keep my laws.”13 I read this to mean that, as a
general principle, submission to the laws of man will offer very real protections, providing in effect
a safe haven within which we can act to obey and serve God.
In his book The Clash of Orthodoxies, Robert P. George has an interesting chapter titled “What
Is Law?” He examines the debates among legal thinkers and philosophers in the English-speaking
world over the last century, beginning with Oliver Wendell Holmes, about the origins and nature
of law. He cites, for example, the group whose legal realist movement flourished to some extent in
the 1930s and 1940s. These scholars debunked the idea of legal objectivity; to be realistic, they maintained, we “should abandon the idea that law pre-exists and is available to guide legal decisions.”14
They argued that judges’ reasoning and citation of laws as the basis of their decisions are in reality
“mere legal rationalization of decisions reached on other grounds.”15
George reviews other theories such as “legal positivism,” which in some versions holds to “the
idea that law ought not to embody or enforce moral judgments.”16 Other proponents, however,
acknowledge that the content of legal rules reflects “nothing so much as the moral judgments prevailing in any society regarding the subject matters regulated by law.”17 For George himself, “legal
rules and principles function as practical reasons for citizens, as well as judges and other officials,
because the citizens appreciate their moral value.”18 He subscribes to the proposition lex iniusta non
est lex (an unjust law is not law), by which he means, if I understand him correctly, that it is essential
for the laws and legal systems created by man to have a basis in natural law or morality.19
In his 1993 encyclical letter titled “Veritatis Splendor,” Pope John Paul II expressed the relevant
Catholic doctrine in these words:
Only by obedience to universal moral norms does man find full confirmation of his personal uniqueness and the
possibility of authentic moral growth. . . . These norms in fact represent the unshakable foundation and solid guarantee of a just and peaceful human coexistence, and hence of genuine democracy, which can come into being and
develop only on the basis of the equality of all its members, who possess common rights and duties. When it is a
matter of the moral norms prohibiting intrinsic evil, there are no privileges or exceptions for anyone. It makes no
difference whether one is the master of the world or the “poorest of the poor” on the face of the earth. Before the
demands of morality we are all absolutely equal.20
Latter-day Saints would necessarily be included among those who believe in preexisting and universal natural law—or, as we might express it, law rooted in the preexisting justice and order of God.
I firmly agree that insofar as humanly possible, man’s laws and legal systems should be tied to God’s
laws and should reflect the same ultimate purpose: to foster our becoming all that we can become
here and hereafter. People instinctively appreciate the value of law that has valid moral underpinnings because it is in their nature as spiritual beings and children of God—the ultimate moral Being.
The light of Christ that we sometimes call conscience lights every person who comes into this world.21
Some of you may be thinking, “This is all very grand, but where, for example,
does tax law fit in?” I would answer that it probably does not, since tax codes are the
work of the devil, right? But in all seriousness, even the very mundane can have a role
if it is supportive of—or at least not inconsistent with—overarching divine principles
and purpose. The Uniform Commercial Code, for example, would seem to have little
if any contribution to make in helping us achieve our divine potential, but even something
so unethereal can have value as part of a larger legal structure that supports fundamental fairness, minimizes strife, rewards honest labor, preserves stable families, and, ultimately, enshrines moral agency.
Returning again to the Doctrine and Covenants:
We believe that all governments necessarily require civil officers and magistrates to enforce the laws of the same;
and that such as will administer the law in equity and justice should be sought for and upheld by the voice of the
people if a republic, or the will of the sovereign.22
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Here, more specifically, we come to many of you in the profession of law. You live in societies
where the system of “civil officers and magistrates” includes judges and lawyers who occupy a vital
role in administering the law “in equity and justice.” You whose first loyalty is to God can press in a
variety of ways for laws and systems that track the divine model or that at least do not undermine it.
Let me be clear that I am not speaking of any endeavor to impose upon society by some sort of fiat
what we see as the appropriate application of divinely revealed principles. We cannot, and we make
no attempt to do so. I am speaking of advocacy and persuasion. At the same time, it will not do
to pretend that an individual or group may not participate in the debates and processes that shape
our laws simply because their arguments are based on moral norms or because their moral vision is
not shared by all citizens. Essentially all legislation is based on moral judgments—religious, secular,
or otherwise, and all parties to the ongoing contest seek to have their ethical and moral concerns
heard. In the end we are governed by those that prevail in the public mind. It is not an imposition of
religion for religionists to take part in the discussion, and there is no justice in one side with deeply
held values seeking to silence another because it espouses different deeply held values.
Consider the example of William Wilberforce and others of his time who sought to conform
the laws of Great Britain to a higher moral standard of equity and justice. Wilberforce is rightly
remembered and revered for his central role in the abolition of the slave trade that was then dominated by British ships. For some 18 years, beginning in 1789, he labored as a member of Parliament
to end this evil commerce and lay the groundwork for the abolition of slavery altogether:
Wilberforce’s involvement in the abolition movement was motivated by a desire to put his
Christian principles into action and to serve God in public life. . . . [He] sensed a call from
God, writing in a journal entry in 1787 that “God Almighty has set before me two great
objects, the suppression of the Slave Trade and the Reformation of Manners [moral values].”23
Initially, Wilberforce’s bills in the House of Commons were easily defeated.
Then, just as momentum began to build, the French Revolution and slave revolts in
the West Indies caused a shift back to caution and delay. During the protracted campaign,
“Wilberforce’s commitment never wavered, despite frustration and hostility. He was supported in
his work by fellow members of the so-called Clapham Sect. . . . Holding evangelical Christian convictions, and consequently dubbed ‘the Saints,’ the group lived in large adjoining houses in
Clapham.”24 Finally, in 1807, Wilberforce’s Abolition Bill passed the House of Lords and was presented to the House of Commons. “As tributes were made to Wilberforce, whose face streamed
with tears, the bill was carried by 283 votes to 16.”25
It is significant to recognize that while Wilberforce, as a member of Parliament, took the leading role in official circles, the active and devoted efforts of many others with no political portfolio were essential to success in the campaign to end the slave trade. The collaboration of Thomas
Clarkson, a fellow graduate of Wilberforce at St. John’s Cambridge, was especially important.
Also critical was the part played by members of the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave
Trade, a group made up primarily of like-minded British Quakers and Anglicans that included
Clarkson and that Wilberforce joined in 1791.
The society was highly successful in raising public awareness and support, and local chapters sprang up
throughout Great Britain. Clarkson travelled the country researching and collecting firsthand testimony and statistics, while the committee promoted the campaign, pioneering techniques such as lobbying, writing pamphlets,
holding public meetings, gaining press attention, organizing boycotts and even using a campaign logo: an image
of a kneeling slave above the motto “Am I Not a Man and a Brother?” designed by the renowned pottery-maker
Josiah Wedgwood. The committee also sought to influence slave-trading nations such as France, Spain, Portugal,
Denmark, Holland and the United States, corresponding with anti-slavery activists in other countries and organising the translation of English-language books and pamphlets. These included books by former slaves Ottobah
Cugoano and Olaudah Equiano, who had published influential works on slavery and the slave trade in 1787 and
1789, respectively. They and other free blacks, collectively known as “Sons of Africa,” spoke at debating societies
and wrote spirited letters to newspapers, periodicals and prominent figures, as well as public letters of support to
campaign allies. . . . The campaign proved to be the world’s first grassroots human rights campaign, in which men
and women from different social classes and backgrounds volunteered to end the injustices suffered by others.26
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William Wilberforce and his allies provide an encouraging example of success after much
labor and against daunting opposition. Not every effort, however, will succeed—at least not initially. Consider a more recent example in the arena of things that bear on marriage and families
and the rearing of children. The “no-fault” divorce laws that have been adopted in the United
States and elsewhere were warned against decades ago by President David O.
McKay and others. The disastrous consequences visited on the institution of marriage since then are clearly evident, with children being the primary victims—
some of whom, given their suffering, are now reluctant to marry and rear families
themselves. But whatever the setbacks in our striving to sustain family or other
moral imperatives among our fellowman, surely we must, as Paul declared, fight
the good fight.27 Mohammed is reported to have said, “Who[so]ever sees a wrong and
is able to put it right with his hand, let him do so; if he can’t, then with his tongue; if he can’t, then
in his heart, and that is the bare minimum of faith.”28
Of all the moral imperatives we seek to embrace and defend in our legal systems, in my opinion it is individual agency and accountability that must always be preeminent, because agency is
so basic to realizing our God-given potential. On the one hand, we should uphold those legal and
political concepts that protect legitimate individual action, and, on the other, we should oppose
those theories and schemes that exert unjust dominion or diminish predictability and consistency in
the operation of law. True, there is some degree of compulsion in any law, but generally it is the kind
designed to preserve space and opportunity for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Other proposals, however, look to compel our acceptance or tolerance of actions that offend the moral conscience. A potential example would be the case of a doctor being forced to participate in an abortion
against his or her conscientious objection on pain of forfeiting the right to practice medicine.
All man-made legal systems are imperfect and include elements of injustice. Still, you can strive
to make the legal system within which you live and work come as close as possible to the perfectly
just “legal system” of God. You can take as your guide not only the wisdom of similarly minded men
and women from the past but also the teachings of the scriptures, prophets, and the Holy Spirit. In
this, as in other matters, you are invited to study out in your own mind concepts regarding the standards, direction, and even the specifics of what the law should be, how the legal system should be
structured, and how it should operate and then to ask God if it be right.29 Surely you are entitled in
your role and sphere to revelation on things that bear so directly on
not only the present estate of man but also his ultimate future.
God finds His glory, as Joseph Smith said, in providing laws
by which other beings can come to enjoy the same perfections
and glory He possesses.30 Our view and motivations should be the
same. Rather than seeing law as an instrument of domination, it is
our mission to use it as an enabling power to help men and women
achieve greater independence and ultimate potential. We do so by
acting to have our earthly governmental and legal systems mirror as
closely as possible the divine order.
After all I have said in praise of law and all the effort I have
enjoined you to make in sustaining and defending a moral order, we
must in the end acknowledge that we cannot achieve ultimate justice apart from Jesus Christ. To establish and preserve the law is a great
good, but the greatest good we can do in helping others become what they
can become will be to lead them to the Savior. Only His Atonement has the
power to overcome all weakness and imperfection and to make right all injustice. Only He can
convert offense and injury into blessings; only He can bring life again to a life unjustly cut short;
only He can return a perfect body for one diseased or malformed; only He can reinstate beloved
associations lost and make them permanent; only He can make right the suffering entailed upon
the innocent by ignorance and oppression; only He can erase the impact of sin on one who is
wronged; only He can remove the stain and effect of sin in the sinner; only He can eliminate sorrow and wipe away all tears;31 only He can provide immortality; only His grace can compensate
for our inadequacy and justify us before that law that enables us to become joint heirs of eternal
life with Him. Of the glorious reality of the living Christ, I bear my witness.
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W

e have many 1ls here today who are already worrying about final exams. During my first year,
my wife, Marie, and I lived in a little apartment on 13th East in Salt Lake City. We were expecting our first baby, Jonathan, who is now an active worker in the byu Law School Alumni
Association and whose daughter Sarah is here today.
As finals approached, I was so consumed by my daily study routine that it was like living
in a diving bell. I just lived at my little worktable, constantly briefing cases and preparing outlines. I knew our baby would come soon, but my mind was elsewhere. Then one night I had
this really vivid dream. I saw myself in my study nook, slaving away. I thought somebody was
watching me. I looked over my shoulder and saw Marie standing in the doorway with a little
boy who was about seven years old.
I said, “Is that our new baby?” She said, “Yes.” I replied, “Well, he’s pretty old, isn’t he?”
She said, “Yes, and we’re sorry to disturb you—we know you’ve got to study. We just have
one little question. Then we’ll leave you alone. You haven’t had time to give our boy a name in
Church, and it’s becoming kind of a problem.”
I looked at this forlorn-looking child. “You don’t have a name?” He said, “No . . . no, Dad,
but it’s okay. You need to study.” I said, “Well, are you in school?” “Yeah. I’m in second grade.”
“Well, if you are in school, the kids have to call you something. What do they call you?” and
he said, “Vargel.” “Vargel?!” I asked. “Do you like that name?” “Well, it’s okay. . . .” I awoke
clawing the air. In the morning I said to Marie, “When is the next fast Sunday?”
First-year law students are often frustrated to discover that our legal system is characterized not by hard, fast rules but by legal principles that often appear to contradict each other.
One new student said he had a “low tolerance for ambiguity.” He had recently returned from
a mission, where his life was highly structured. But in law school he felt totally at sea, groping
to find whatever would tell him all the rules of law. Let’s put his questions into a larger perspective. Ambiguity is not only part of law school—it is often part of life.
When we are young, most of us tend to think in terms of black or white; there isn’t much
gray in our perspective. So most younger lds adults have a childlike optimism and a loyalty that
make them wonderfully teachable. One older byu student said that one thing he likes about
being in a student ward full of freshmen and sophomores is that when topics like faith or
repentance are discussed, nobody yawns.
As time goes on, however, experience often introduces a new dimension to our perspective. We may begin to see a kind of gap between the real and the ideal, between what is and
what ought to be.
Imagine two circles, one inside the other. The inner boundary is “the real,” or what is. The
outer boundary is “the ideal,” or what ought to be. We stand at the inner boundary of reality,
reaching to move our reality closer to the ideal. We first see the gap between these two boundaries when we realize that some things about ourselves or others are not what we expected—
or what we wish they were. This realization can be frustrating.
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w e r e a l i z e t h at
some things
a b o u t o u r s e lv e s
or others
a r e n o t w h at
we expected.

Even our experience with Church institutions can introduce us to this gap, in part because
our idealistic expectations may be very high. For example, a new byu student may find it hard
to be one among 30,000 students battling the red-tape machine that seems to control the processes of admission, registering for classes, or transferring credits from another school. A new
student may feel unknown and nameless to a student ward bishop who is inundated with many
new ward members all at once. Or he may brush up against a faculty member whose attitudes
about the Church are more flexible (or more rigid) than he had expected them to be.
At a more personal level, perhaps an important prayer goes too long unanswered or one
suffers a surprise health setback or an unexpected conflict with a family member. Perhaps one
becomes conscious of the imperfections of other Church members or leaders or of one’s own
parents. When we become acquainted at an adult level with those who have been our heroes,
we naturally begin to see their human limitations. Or perhaps one has an encounter with antiMormon literature or one discovers differing doctrinal views among Church leaders.
Experiences like these can produce uncertainty and ambivalence—in a word, ambiguity—
and we may yearn for simpler, easier times when life was more clear and felt more under our
control. We might sense within ourselves the beginnings of skepticism, of unwillingness to
respond to authority or to invitations to commit ourselves to demanding goals or projects.
Not everybody will encounter what I have been describing, and not everyone must
encounter it. But sooner or later, many Church members do run into at least some forms of
ambiguity. Our basic doctrines are clear, potent, and unambiguous. But we can encounter
some uncertainty even in studying the scriptures. Consider, for example, when Nephi took
Laban’s life in order to obtain the brass plates. That exceptional case is not easy to interpret
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until the reader realizes that God Himself, who gave the original commandment not to kill,
was also the source of Nephi’s instructions.
Consider also the case of Peter on the night he denied any knowledge of his Master. We
typically regard Peter as something of a coward. We assume his commitment wasn’t strong
enough to make him rise to the Savior’s defense. But I once heard President Spencer W.
Kimball say that the Savior’s statement that Peter would deny Him three times just might
have been a request to Peter, not a prediction. Jesus might have been instructing His chief
Apostle to deny knowing Him in order to ensure strong leadership for the Church after the
Crucifixion. So perhaps we shouldn’t judge Peter too quickly.
Consider other scriptures. The Lord has said that He “cannot look upon sin with the least
degree of allowance” (d&c 1:31). Yet elsewhere He said,” I have forgiven you your sins” (d&c
64:3) and “Neither do I condemn thee: go, and sin no more” (John 8:11). Justice is indeed a divine
law, but so is the doctrine of mercy. At times these two correct principles can seem inconsistent, until the unifying higher principles of the Atonement bring them together.
God has given us correct principles by which we may govern ourselves, yet these very principles may at times be in conflict. Choosing between two principled alternatives (two “goods”)
is more difficult than choosing in a stark and obvious contrast between good and evil.
A common question among law students (and lawyers) is how to balance one’s duties to
family, Church, and school or profession. One young mother had a large family, a responsible
Church calling, and a busy husband. She was bewildered about what should come first in her
life and when. Someone told her, “Well, just be sure you put the Lord’s work first.” Her reply:
“But what if it is all the Lord’s work?”
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the mists of darkness in
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Church and family life are not the only topics in which the right answer is not always on
the tip of our tongues. Think about the recent u.s. war in Iraq. With the hindsight of a few
years, was that war a colossal mistake or was it a heroic act of liberating a nation? Or consider
whether we should sell everything except what is truly necessary for our survival and donate
our surplus to those with far greater needs than ours. We might also ask how much governmental intervention into the regulation of business and private life is too much—or not enough.
The people on the extreme sides of such questions often seem very certain about the right
answer. But some people would rather be certain than right.
We also encounter ambiguity in literature. One byu teacher said that great literature will
usually raise a profound question, explore the question skillfully, then leave the matter for the
reader to resolve. If the resolution seems too clear or too simple, maybe the literature isn’t very
good or perhaps the reader has missed its point.
So life is full of ambiguities, because some uncertainty is characteristic of the mortal experience. The mists of darkness in Lehi’s dream symbolize life as we face it on this planet. There
are, thankfully, many things in mortality that are very certain and very clear—beautifully represented by the iron rod in Lehi’s dream. But much complexity still surrounds us.
Given, then, the existence of a gap for most of us between where we stand and where we
would like to be, and given that we will have at least some experiences that make us wonder
what to do, I suggest three ascending levels of dealing with ambiguity.
At level one, I’ve noticed two typical attitudes. One of them occurs when we simply
ity—and thereby removing the gap. They cling to the ideal so single-mindedly that
do not—perhaps cannot—even see the probthey just don’t feel the frustration that would come from facing the real facts—perlems that exist. Some people seem almost
haps about themselves, about others, or about the world around them. People in this
consciously to filter out any perception of
group have sometimes written letters to the editor of the Daily Universe expressing
a gap between the real and the ideal. For
their shock at discovering that something at byu falls short of perfection.
them, the gospel at its best is a firm handThose in this group struggle to distinguish between imperfections that matter a
shake, an enthusiastic greeting, and a smiley
great deal and those that may not matter much. For instance, Hugh Nibley once said
button. Their mission was the best, their
that some people think it is better to get up at 5:00 a.m. to write a bad book than to get
ward is the best, and every new day is probaup at 9:00 a.m. to write a good book. While self-discipline is a virtue, he didn’t think
bly going to be the best day they ever had.
the exact hour when we arise is quite as important as what we do once we are up.
These cheerful ones are happy, spontaneous,
I recall listening to a group of young Church members discussing which of the
and optimistic, and they always manage
two types of people just described offered the best model for their emulation. They
to hang loose and relax. They are able to
felt they had to choose between being relaxed, carefree, and happy about everyweather many storms that seem formidable
thing in life or being an intense, uncompromising perfectionist. As I listened, I
to more pessimistic types, although one
began to see that both categories suffer from the same limitation. There isn’t much
wonders if they have somehow missed hearreal difference between a forced superficial happiness and a frantic concern with
ing that a storm is going on.
apparent perfection.
A second group at level one has a differBoth perspectives lack depth; they understand things too quickly, and they draw
ent problem with the gap between what is
conclusions from their experience too easily. Neither is well prepared for adversity,
and what ought to be. This group eliminates
and I fear that the first strong wind that comes along will blow them over. Their roots
the distance between the real and the ideal
haven’t sunk deep enough into the soil of experience to establish a firm foundation.
by, in effect, erasing the inner circle of realBoth groups reflect the thinness of a philosophy that is untempered by common sense.
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l e a d, k i n dly l ig h t
Lead, kindly Light, amid th’encircling gloom;
Lead thou me on!
The night is dark, and I am far from home;
Lead thou me on!
Keep thou my feet; I do not ask to see
The distant scene—one step enough for me.
I was not ever thus, nor pray’d that thou
Shouldst lead me on.
I loved to choose and see my path; but now,
Lead thou me on!
I loved the garish day, and, spite of fears,
Pride ruled my will. Remember not past years.
So long thy pow’r hath blest me, sure it still
Will lead me on
O’er moor and fen, o’er crag and torrent, till
The night is gone.
And with the morn those angel faces smile,
Which I have loved long since, and lost awhile!
TEXT

John Henry Newman, 1801–1890

MUSIC
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It would help them if they were more realistic about life, even if that took them out of their
comfort zone. That discomfort—the very discomfort you feel with law school’s ambiguity and
in life—can motivate you to lean into the wind and experience some real growth. After all, the
true Church is intended not only to comfort the afflicted but also to afflict the comfortable.
Let us then step up to level two, where we see what Jacob called “things as they really are”
(Jacob 4:13). Only then can we deal with reality in a meaningful and constructive way. If we
are not willing to grapple with the frustration that comes from facing bravely the uncertainties
we encounter, we may never develop the kind of spiritual maturity that is necessary to reach
our ultimate destination. Heber C. Kimball once said that the Church must yet pass through
some very close places and that those who are living on “borrowed light” will not be able to
stand when those days come (in Orson F. Whitney, Life of Heber C. Kimball [Salt Lake City:
Bookcraft, 1967], 450). What is borrowed light? It is living off someone else’s testimony and
not really dealing with whatever the issues are for you.
So we must learn how to form judgments of our own about the value of ideas, opportunities, or people who may come into our lives. We can’t depend on somebody else’s light
to tell us whether a certain idea is “Church approved,” because new ideas don’t always come
along with little tags attached saying whether they have been reviewed at Church headquarters. Whether in the form of music, books, friends, or opportunities to serve, there is much
that is lovely or of good report or praiseworthy that is not the subject of detailed discussion in
Church manuals, conference talks, or courses of instruction. Those who aren’t open to people
or experiences that are not obviously related to some Church word or program may well live
less abundant lives—and make fewer contributions—than the Lord intends.
One of today’s cultural soft spots is that we live in the age of the sound bite. If you can’t
express a thought in a short phrase or reduce it to a quick text message, some think it must
not matter very much. Be careful about that. That reductionist approach can destroy real
thought, impairing our capacity to think about what is going on and to help solve real problems. Don’t just pick the label that kind of seems “in.”
We must develop enough independence and judgment that we are ready for the shafts of
adversity and contradiction that may come to us. When those times come, we can’t be living
on borrowed light. Don’t be deceived by the clear-cut labels others may use to describe circumstances that are, in fact, not so clear. Our encounters with reality and disappointment are
actually vital stages in the development of our maturity and understanding.
Now, having considered the value of a level-two awareness, there are still some serious
hazards at this stage. One’s acceptance of the clouds of uncertainty may be so complete that
the iron rod seems to fade into the blurring mists and skepticism becomes a guiding philosophy. This perspective can come from erasing the outer circle representing the ideal, or what
ought to be, and then focusing too much on the inner circle of reality. Sometimes you want
to eliminate the frustration of the gap between the real and the ideal by just giving up on your
ideals. And you can be persuaded to do that by your disappointment in seeing what some people do with their ideals when they are too shallow about them.
I spoke earlier of a new law student’s low tolerance for ambiguity. But I also saw that by
the time our law students reached their third year of study, some of them could develop such
a high tolerance for ambiguity that they were skeptical about everything. Where formerly
they felt that they had all the answers but just didn’t know what the questions were, now
they seemed to have all of the questions but few of the answers. Who wants answers? Isn’t
law school only about questions?
People who take too much delight in their finely honed tools of skepticism and dispassionate
analysis will limit their effectiveness in law practice, at home, in Church, and elsewhere because
they can become contentious, arrogant, and unwilling to commit themselves. I have seen—and I
suspect you have seen—some of them try out their new intellectual tools in a Church classroom.
A well-meaning teacher will make a point that the skeptic considers a little silly, so he yields to an
irresistible urge to leap to his feet and publicly deflate the teacher’s momentum.
These overly analytical types always look for opportunities to point out the exception to
any rule anybody can state. They delight in cross-examining the unsuspecting mother-in-law.
Or someone offers a good idea in gospel doctrine class, and they see a clever way to shoot it

down. Then they sit there chortling because they have popped another idealistic bubble that
people were liking until they heard the skeptical question. When some of those bubbles pop,
out goes much of the feeling of trust, loyalty, harmony, and sincerity so essential to preserving the Spirit of the Lord.
If that begins to happen in our ward, in our home, or in our marriage, we may be eroding
the fragile fabric of trust that binds us together in all loving relationships. People may come
away from their encounters with us wondering how we can possibly have a deep commitment to the gospel and say some of the things we say.
I am not saying we should always just smile and nod our approval, implying that everything is wonderful and that our highest hope is for everybody to have a nice day. That is level
one. I am encouraging us to realize the potential for harm as well as good that can come with
what education and experience can do to our minds and our way of dealing with other people.
These dangers are not limited to our relations with others. They can become very personal, prying into our own hearts in unhealthy ways. The ability to acknowledge ambiguity
is not a final form of enlightenment. Once our increased tolerance and patience enable us to
look longer and harder at difficult questions and pat answers, we must be careful that our
basic posture toward spiritual things doesn’t shift from being committed to being noncommittal. That is not a healthy posture.
Many people these days think it is naïve to be committed to such basic ideals as marriage
or professionalism or patriotism. For instance, it is increasingly popular for people to feel
hemmed in by marriage commitments; they prefer what some call a “nonbinding commitment,” a term that sounds quite trendy. But I don’t know what a nonbinding commitment is.
And I don’t think that the people who use that term know what it is either. It just sort of gives
them an escape. They think they can have it both ways: being committed but not being committed. Be careful about that.
Indeed, in many ways, a Church member who moves from a stage of commitment to a
stage of being tentative and noncommittal is in a worse position than one who has never experienced a basic commitment. The previously
committed person may too easily assume he
assigned to work with a brand-new missionary. Just after he arrived, I was called to a meeting
has already been through the “positive menin another city. He stayed to work in our city with another new missionary whose companion
tal attitude” routine and “knows better” now,
went with me. We thought it would be good for their character to tract. There was no mtc in
as he judges. He may assume that being subthose days, so these two knew only a couple of sentences in German between them.
missive, meek, obedient, and humble is the
After returning, I asked how his day had gone. He said eagerly that they had found a
“been there, done that” part of his life and he
woman who would surely join the Church. They hadn’t really talked with her, because she
has now outgrown the need to be that way
spoke no English. But he felt an unusually strong spiritual impression about her and her famagain. Those are the assumptions of a hardily. In our mission it was rare to see anyone join the Church, let alone a whole family. I asked
ened heart. In spiritual things—in our relafor more details, but in his excitement he had forgotten to write down either the name or the
tionship with the Lord, the scriptures, and
address. He knew only that they were on the top floor of a five-story apartment house, and he
the Church—the shift from being committhought he’d recognize the name next to the doorbell.
ted to being noncommittal can actually be a
“Great,” I thought, contemplating all those flights of polished staircases. I explained that
switch from one shallow extreme to another.
people who are polite don’t necessarily intend to join the Church. But off we went to find
I once learned quite a lesson about the her. He couldn’t remember the street name either, so we picked a likely spot in our tracting
way a highly developed tolerance for “being area and began climbing stairs.
realistic” can inhibit the workings of the
After a frustrating couple of hours, I decided I had to level with him. Based on my
Spirit in our lives. When I had been on my months of experience, I said it simply wasn’t worth our time to hunt any longer. Stunned,
mission in Germany about a year, I was Elder Keeler said, “I told you what I felt about her. Are you telling me we’re not going to find
her?” I tried patiently to explain the realities of missionary work in Europe. His eyes filled with
tears as he said, “I came on my mission to find the honest in heart. The Spirit told me that that
woman will someday be a member of the Church. Won’t you help me find her?” I mumbled
something like, “Maybe the Spirit was just telling you to write down the name and address.”
So I raced him up one staircase after another. “Elder Keeler, had enough?” “No,” he said.
“We’ve got to find her.” I stepped up the pace and decided to move so fast he would beg to
stop—then maybe he would get the message. Finally, out of breath on a fifth floor, he saw the
name by a doorbell and said, “I think that’s the one!” She came to the door. He jabbed my ribs
with his elbow and whispered, “That’s the woman! Talk to her!”

clar k

me m orand um

19

a rt c r e di t s
Photographs by Mitch Dobrowner
Pages 12–13: Mushroom Cloud
Page 15: Arcus Cloud
Page 16: Arm of God
Page 20: Clouds

20

c l a rk

m e mo randu m

That was over 40 years ago. Not long ago Marie and I were with that woman, her husband, and all of their four children and their spouses in the Frankfurt Temple. We saw the
father, now a temple sealer, seal their youngest daughter and her new husband for eternity. The
mother has been a Relief Society president. The father has been a bishop. Three of the children
have served missions, and all four have married other faithful Europeans in the temple. Her
grandson was in our home in Utah this summer, and he has just received his mission call.
That experience is a lesson I can never forget about the limitations of skepticism and a
tolerance for ambiguity. I hope that I will never be so aware of reality that I am unresponsive to heavenly whisperings. So, be realistic, be honest and open, but don’t let those things
harden your heart.
The most productive response to ambiguity is at level three, where we see things not only
with our eyes wide open but with our hearts wide open as well. When we do that, there will be
many times when we need to take action, even though we want more evidence before knowing
exactly what to do. Such occasions may range from following the counsel of the Brethren when
we don’t understand the reasons for their counsel to accepting a Church calling when we are
too busy to take on any more duties. My experience has taught me always to give the Lord and
His Church the benefit of any doubts I may have when such a case seems too close to call.
The willingness to be believing and accepting in these cases is not the same as blind obedience. Don’t confuse the two—a good lawyer can see the difference. You can develop a loving
and knowing kind of obedience that is not blind at all. G. K. Chesterton once distinguished
between “optimists,” “pessimists,” and “improvers,” which roughly corresponds to our three
levels of dealing with ambiguity. He concluded that both the optimists and the pessimists
look too much at only one side of things—that’s level one and level two. Neither the extreme

optimists nor the extreme pessimists would
ever be of much help in improving human
conditions, because people can’t solve problems unless they are willing to acknowledge
that a problem exists while also remaining
loyal enough to do something about it.
Chesterton said the evil of the excessive
optimist (level one) is that he
will defend the indefensible. He is the jingo of the
universe; he will say, “My cosmos, right or wrong.”
He will be less inclined to the reform of things; more
inclined to a sort of front-bench official answer to all
attacks, soothing every one with assurances. He will
not wash the world, but whitewash the world. [G. K.
Chesterton, Orthodoxy (New York: Cosimo,
Inc., 2007), 62]
On the other hand, the evil of the pessimist (level two) is “not that he chastises gods
and men, but that he does not love what he
chastises.” In being the so-called “candid
friend,” the pessimist is not really candid.
Chesterton continued:
He is keeping something back—his own gloomy
pleasure in saying unpleasant things. He has a secret
desire to hurt, not merely to help. . . .
. . . He is using that ugly knowledge which was
allowed him [in order] to strengthen the army, to
discourage people from joining it. [Id., 61]

at l e v e l o n e , p e o p l e e i t h e r d o n o t
o r c a n n o t s e e t h at t h e r e a r e b o t h a k i n d ly
light and a gloomy fog; or, even if
they see both, they don’t see the difference
between the light and the gloom.

there are both a kindly light and a gloomy fog; or, even if they see both, they don’t see the
difference between the light and the gloom. At level two, the difference is acutely apparent,
but one’s acceptance of the ambiguity might be so pessimistic as to say, “Remember that the
hour is darkest just before everything goes totally black.” Some people just focus on the light,
others on the darkness. We need to see both and keep moving. “Lead, kindly Light, amid
th’encircling gloom; Lead thou me on!”
Consider one final illustration from a lawyer who understood levels two and three. His
eyes were fully open to the reality, including the pain, of seeing things for what they were. Yet
he had moved beyond that to a third level where his mature perspective permitted him to subordinate what he saw with those wide-open eyes to what he felt in his wide-open heart.
This lawyer was my father. He was in his mid-50s and had a busy professional life with
heavy obligations that often took him out of town for several days at a time. He was tired. At
an earlier time in his life he had served for 10 years in a stake presidency.
His good friend was called to be the bishop of their ward. He said he couldn’t accept the
assignment unless my father would serve as his first counselor. Well, it’s one thing to be called
as a bishop’s counselor when one is young and full of enthusiasm and one’s time is not heavily
committed. One might understandably have a different attitude at a later, busier time in life.
Here are my father’s inner thoughts as he wrote them that day in his journal:

Some stupid people started the idea that because
women obviously back up their own people through
everything, therefore women are blind and do not
see anything. They can hardly have known any
women. The same women who are ready to defend
their men through thick and thin are . . . almost
morbidly lucid about the thinness of his excuses or
the thickness of his head. . . . Love is not blind; that
is the last thing that it is. Love is bound; and the
more it is bound the less it is blind. [Id., 63]

My first reaction was, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me. . . . I know something of the work
required of a bishopric; it is a constant, continual grind. . . . I am busy and my [personal] affairs demand
what spare time and energy I have. In some respects I am not humble and prayerful enough; I have not
always been willing to submit unquestioningly to all the decisions of the Church . . . but neither do I feel that I
can say no to any call that is made by the Church, and so now I add to my first reaction, “Nevertheless, not
as I will, but as Thou wilt.”
I will resolve to do it as best I can. There will be times when I will chafe under the endless meetings, but
I am going to get completely in tune with the [Church] program. I do not intend to get sanctimonious, but
there must be no reservations in my heart about my duties. It will not be hard for me to pay my tithing and
attend regularly, as I have been doing that. But I will have to learn, I suppose, to love the Deseret News,
or at least the Church Section, as much as I love the Tribune. . . . I will have to get to the temple more often.
. . . I will have to become better acquainted with the ward members and be genuinely interested in them and
their problems. . . . I will have to learn to love every one of them and to dispose myself in such a way that they
might find it possible to feel the same toward me. Perhaps in my weak way I will have to try and live as close
to the Lord as we expect the General Authorities to do.

Chesterton’s arranging of these categories
makes me think of one other way to compare
the differing perspectives people bring to
the way they cope with ambiguity. Consider
the image of “lead, kindly Light,” an image
about light in a gathering storm. At level
one, people either do not or cannot see that

My father was an honest man who chose to have a believing heart. His approach makes me
want to deal directly, but humbly, with life’s ambiguities. I want to be as childlike as my education has taught me to be tough-minded, able to help solve a problem rather than just describe it.
May we be honest and courageous enough to face squarely the uncertainties we encounter, try to understand them, and then do something about them. Perhaps then we will not be
living on borrowed light. “Love is not blind; that is the last thing that it is. Love is bound; and
the more it is bound the less it is blind.”

In going on to describe the “improvers”
(level three—from optimists to pessimists to
improvers), Chesterton talked about women
who are so loyal to those who need them:
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the encapsulation of what I have learned in
If then God so clothe the grass, which is to day
my life and my career.
in the field, and to morrow is cast into the oven; how
You may recall that Much Ado About much more will he clothe you, O ye of little faith?
Nothing is a comedy with two main characAnd seek not ye what ye shall eat, or what ye
ters, Benedick and Beatrice, each being the shall drink, neither be ye of doubtful mind.
witty representative of their gender in castiFor all these things do the nations of the world
gating the opposite gender. As Shakespeare seek after: and your Father knoweth that ye have
has their friends play on their egos and their need of these things.
inherent good natures (despite their prickly
But rather seek ye the kingdom of God; and all
exteriors), these two people, who swore these things shall be added unto you. . . .
never to engage in the folly of love, develop
For where your treasure is, there will your
and demonstrate a truly caring relation- heart be also.2
ship with each other. As the play develops,
Beatrice’s cousin Hero is maligned by the
In this passage Jesus reminds us that
evil character Don John, and, choosing to the secular things in our careers—earning
believe the slander, Hero’s fiancé, Claudio, money for food, drink, and fancy clothes—
abandons and humiliates her at the marriage are all things that “the nations of the world
altar. Beatrice is devastated by this
seek after.” Thus, when we focus priinjury to her beloved cousin, and thus
marily on this goal, we are like everyThis
when Benedick comes to confess fully
one else. What should distinguish us
article
his love for her and asks her how he
as followers of Christ is the focus of
can demonstrate this love, she orders
our minds, our hearts, and our souls
comprises
him to kill Claudio, Benedick’s best
on the kingdom of God. This seems
excerpts
friend. When Benedick cannot talk
like a pretty obvious component of
Beatrice out of what to him seems an
success, but its obvious nature does
from an
unreasonable demand, he reluctantly
not prevent the enticements of the
Honored
agrees to challenge Claudio to a duel.
trappings of material and worldly sucBenedick returns after making the
cess from diverting many from a focus
Alumni
challenge to report to Beatrice that
on serving God.
he has done her bidding, and, after Lecture given
Does this scripture literally mean
some witty repartee, the two have a
that we should not worry about how
at byu Law
serious moment. Benedick asks how
to feed and clothe ourselves and our
her cousin fares. Beatrice reports that School on families? I don’t think so. I think it is a
her cousin is very ill. He then asks
lesson in priorities. If we serve God, if
October
Beatrice how she herself fares, and
we seek the kingdom of God first, we
23, 2010.
she reports that she is also very ill. He
will find personal success, whether or
responds, in an uncharacteristic show
not it is success that is defined as such
of serious tenderness: “Serve God,
in the world. Success without serving
love me, and mend.”1 I would suggest that God can never be true success because we
this advice, seriously and lovingly given, is can never be successful when we act couna template for success in our profession or, ter to our inherent nature. We are children
better said, a template for how to assess suc- of our Heavenly Father, and if we are not
cess in our lives.
serving Him, we are not acting consistently
with our divine heritage. The Apostle Paul
s e rv e g od
asks: “Who shall separate us from the love of
Christ? shall tribulation, or distress, or perseThe first advice Benedick gives is to cution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or
“serve God.” This statement is reminis- sword?”3 He answers:
cent of the admonition found in the New
Testament:
For I am persuaded, that neither death, nor
life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor
Consider the lilies how they grow: they toil things present, nor things to come,
not, they spin not; and yet I say unto you, that
Nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature,
Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of shall be able to separate us from the love of God,
these.
which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.4
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While nothing can force or create a separation between us and the love of God, we
need to remember that we can separate ourselves from that love by our own choices
and our own actions resulting from these
choices.
Does our devotion to God ever interfere
with our sought-for success in our careers?
Absolutely. We have both time and financial
commitments to our Church with which
others do not have to contend. We have
family commitments that many of our colleagues find to be inconsistent with success.
We have standards that we abide by that
sometimes make us the focus of derision or
disdain. We deal with people who are ignorantly intolerant of our religion who judge
us in the context of their preconceived (and
most often ill-conceived) notion of what our
religion means or is. Our religion is not a passive religion. Rather, it requires daily sacrifice
of time, of money, of missed business opportunities, and sometimes even a sacrifice of
worldly acclaim. “Serve God” has to be the
first foundation of any success.

l ov e me
Benedick’s second admonition is “love
me.” He is talking to Beatrice as his future
wife, and his advice really is a reminder to
focus our efforts on loving our families. As
with the admonition to serve God, we cannot find true success in our lives without
being devoted to our families. And to go a
step further, we cannot truly be devoted to
our families without making sacrifices in
our careers on their behalf. In fact, I would
venture to say that if you have not made any
sacrifices in your career for your family, you
should question whether you really value
your family above your career.
With five children, decisions made by
and for our family did not always meet with
universal approval by each of the children.
When these situations arose, I would always
remind the unhappy child or children that
we were a family and that as a family we had
to sacrifice for each other. While a particular
decision might be for the benefit of only one
family member—requiring the rest of the
family to sacrifice for that family member—
each of us knew in turn that when our time
of need came, the family would sacrifice for
us as well.

There were many times in my career
when my choices made to meet the needs
of my family came at the expected price of
a failed or curtailed career. I worked parttime for many years at a time when this was
highly unusual and with the attendant
stigma that came (and sometimes still
comes) with this choice that I was
not truly devoted to my career or
somehow was not keeping up with
my peers. When I was invited by
my firm to work in a home office,
I agreed to do so to finish paying
off my husband’s medical school
debt, but I had no expectation that
my career would go anywhere. I
mean, in a time before e-mail and the
Internet, with four children at home,
including a new baby, how could I possibly succeed in my career? I anticipated
that this family-driven choice sounded the
death knell of my career. It was surprising
for me to discover that my mostly New York
clients did not care about my unorthodox
working arrangements. They only cared
about whether they were being represented
and advised well.
Because of my choice to work part-time
and then in a home office, I also watched
my male contemporaries pass me by with
higher pay, wider acclaim, and better work
opportunities. It was at times very painful
to realize that, from a career advancement
perspective, I was being left behind in my
profession, and I was not sure I would ever
be able to catch up. Even after I moved into
a more mainstream practice of my career, I
still had to suffer enduring discrimination,
particularly on the issue of unequal (meaning lesser) pay for women. A female colleague recently sent me an article on a new
study conducted by professors at Temple
University and the University of Texas–Pan
American concluding that women attorneys
are still paid significantly less than their male
counterparts and that such disparity is not
performance based—women lawyers being
found to be just as productive as men. I did
not need to read a study to conclude this. I
lived this. I was not able to control this part
of my career until recently, so I focused
instead on building in the flexibility I needed
to meet my family needs, on developing the
skills I needed to be a good lawyer, and on
feeling good about that.

In an oft-quoted statement among lawyers, Joseph Story said: “[The law] is a jealous
mistress, and requires a long and constant
courtship. It is not to be won by trifling
favors, but by lavish homage.”5 Anyone who
has practiced law understands this analogy
and the enticements of the 24/7 approach
modern attorneys take to the practice.
How do we cope with this disparity
between the realities of modern law practice
and our need to devote time to our families?
When we compare ourselves and our successes with others, we will always be disappointed. As I used to say to my children, just
remember that no matter how smart you are,
there will always be somebody smarter. We
need to find satisfaction in doing the best
we can in the sphere in which we find ourselves, large or small. We should not fall into
the trap of competing with those who have
accepted the law as their jealous (and only)
mistress.
We also need to redefine the meaning
of success. My father, now in his 80s, is an
electrical engineer who had a very successful career and is a well-recognized inventor.
He recently said to me that when you get to
his age you realize that it is only family that
matters. No matter how successful we are
in our careers, it is only a fleeting aspect of
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this life. You may be king of the hill in your
profession today, but there will always be
others charging up the hill to take your place.
Remember, however, that you will never be
replaced as the mother or father or sister or
brother or daughter or son in your family.
In a well-known passage from the Book
of Mormon, Alma starts with the wish “O
that I were an angel”6 and ends up with the
hope that if he can be an “instrument in the
hands of God to bring some soul to repentance,”7 he will feel successful. Alma progresses from a grandiose wish to a feeling
of contentment in whatever small sphere he
finds himself with the hope for the opportunity to change even one life. This is a great
pattern for redefining success.
“Love me” reminds us that you must love
and sacrifice for your family as the second
foundation of real success.

mend
The third piece of advice Benedick gives
is to mend. Beatrice and her cousin have suffered a great injustice, and they both are made
unwell by the wrong done them. Beatrice’s
response to this injustice is to ask Benedick to

kill Claudio, the perceived source of the injustice. When Benedick is unable to talk her out of
this demand for retributive justice, he returns,
having made the challenge, but advises her
that rather than seeking revenge, she should
focus her efforts internally to mend.
My husband is a doctor, and when
our oldest son was very young, he
once explained, in response to a
question as to what his parents did:
“My dad helps sick people. My
mom works for money.” I think
this assessment is not far off from
the public perception of what we
do as lawyers. In reality our jobs
are not much different than doctors. As lawyers, we are, or should
be, problem solvers. We are there
to heal, or mend, the problems of
others. We are entrusted with resolving the injustices suffered by our clients. Sometimes those injustices are at the
hands of other parties. Sometimes, as in my
area of the law—bankruptcy—the source of
the harm is less focused, but its impact can
be widespread. It can be an unattributed
injustice, being a by-product of a distressed
economy or a changing industry or business
environment or honest management mistakes; but it is a problem that we, as lawyers,
are uniquely qualified to solve.
Similar to the reaction of Beatrice, our
society has become so litigious that when
any injustice is suffered, the first response is
to sue. Sometimes this is the best response,
but a good lawyer will understand the
options and will help a client to mend, to
figure out a solution that will focus on and
then remedy the real problem, not just the
emotionally perceived one. When I started
practicing business bankruptcy law, I
thought that at least this was not a practice
that had an emotional component. It was
not like divorce law, for example. This was
a mistaken perception. I quickly learned that
people are very emotional about money. In
addition, my area of the law deals with people’s jobs, their abilities to support their families, their investments in their businesses,
honestly made mistakes with serious consequences, and sometimes betrayal by dishonest or downright fraudulent behavior. I now
understand that every area of the law has an
emotional component. Like Benedick counseled Beatrice, we as lawyers need to help

our clients work through emotionally charged
situations and mend.
One of the things I love about practicing bankruptcy law is that, most of the
time, bankruptcy lawyers know when to
quit fighting. We litigate to bring about
a business solution, understanding that
with scarce resources and money, creative
approaches are warranted. We understand
that we are not just lawyers but counselors.
As with all lawyers, our job is often to sacrifice our own inclinations in order to serve
our clients. At times that may mean keeping an even temperament in an abusive or
heated situation. It may mean that we settle
a case that we feel certain we could win.
It may mean that we submerge our ego or
emotional investment in a course of action
to accept a better solution for a client’s business needs. It may mean that we forego
higher fees we could earn if the client were
to choose a certain legal remedy because
another legal remedy is a better fit for the
client. Our job is to help our clients mend,
to fully understand their problems, and to
address them with caring and competence.
What I have found to be most important
to clients who end up seeking to redress their
injustices in the courts is simply to know that
they have been heard, that they have been listened to and understood, and to feel that they
have been fairly judged. It is our job to make
sure this happens by being competent lawyers
and helping clients, whether big or small, to
mend. Harper Lee said it best, through the
voice of her literary creation, Atticus Finch,
when he said in his closing argument:
There is one way in this country in which all men
are created equal. . . . That institution . . . is a court.
. . . Our courts have their faults, as does any human
institution, but in this country our courts are the great
levelers, and in our courts all men are created equal.8
We, as lawyers, provide access to this great
societal equalizer. Serving our clients, or
mending their injuries, should be the third
foundation of success.
All three foundations of success I have
mentioned are bound together by a common focus on others. This shared theme
takes us back to the admonition in the scriptures: “For whosoever will save his life shall
lose it: and whosoever will lose his life for
my sake shall find it.”9 As a woman entering

a profession at a time when there were very
few practicing women lawyers, I struggled
as a minority to find my way and to belong
in this profession. What I discovered in my
quest—something I did not even realize
until I was there—was that when we talk
about belonging, we need to change our
focus. We need to stop focusing on ourselves
and start focusing on others. When we focus
on others, then we can belong, no matter
how different we feel and are. Long before
I even understood the foundations of my
success in this profession, this is what I was
inadvertently learning.
None of us are ever entirely responsible for success in our careers. None of us
are self-made men or women, as is so well
articulated in the oft-quoted phrase of John
Donne: “No man is an island.”10 Each of us
stands on the shoulders of others. Sometimes
those supporting shoulders come from unexpected places. For me, it was, surprisingly,
the intercession and support of some of the
New York partners in my firm during critical years. One of these partners, who started
working with me while I was working parttime in a home office, initially required that
I check in with him every single day, as he
was concerned about whether I could adequately handle a difficult case for one of his
very important clients. After he had watched
me in action, he became one of my greatest
advocates. While, during that period, I saw
limited prospects for my career as a home
office lawyer in the late ’80s, he and other of
my New York partners looked beyond my
unconventional trappings and saw a talented
problem solver for whom they provided
work opportunities and political support
within the firm. Remembering the kindness
of these partners to me, I have tried to emulate them when I am now asked for favors to
help others in their careers. Success brings
more ability to help others, and that is the
obligation of those who succeed.
Last week, at a meeting of the American
College of Bankruptcy, I heard a report
on a historical project done by the college
wherein bankruptcy practitioners from the
1930s and 1940s (all men, of course) were
interviewed. During this time period, virtually all bankruptcy practitioners nationwide
were Jews. As was explained by these men,
that was because other areas of practice
were not open to Jews. They were openly

discriminated against, and none of the large
firms would hire them. Bankruptcy law at
that time was not a mainstream practice
for large firms. It was looked down on, so
it was an area open for these excluded Jews
to fill in with their own small boutique firms.
I found it interesting that the area of practice
I eventually specialized in—which was not
what I intended to choose in law school—has
historically been a haven for the excluded in
the profession. Somehow, as a discriminated
minority myself, I find it fitting to eventually
have been welcomed by this same specialty.
Harper Lee once wrote: “People who have
made peace with themselves are the people I
most admire in the world.”11 I agree. Perhaps,
in the end, that is why we admire her literary
creation, Atticus Finch, so much, because
Harper Lee created a lawyer she admired, a
lawyer who was not perfect but who was a
person who had made peace with himself. If
we are to belong in this profession, we also
need to make peace with ourselves. I would
suggest that we can do this through serving God, loving our families, and mending
the wrongs suffered by our clients. In focusing our efforts on others, in losing ourselves
in serving others, we can be at peace with
ourselves. By focusing our education, our
abilities, and our opportunities on others, we
can, in some small way, change this difficult
profession into something a bit better. “Serve
God, love me, and mend.” With your legal
education, you have a wonderful opportunity
to make a difference in the world. Do it.
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rticle II of the Constitution authorizes the President, “by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur.”1 The Supremacy Clause declares that, like the Constitution and statutes, “all”
treaties “shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”2 Despite use of the word “all,” some
treaties are not automatically enforceable in u.s. courts. The Supreme Court held in
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1829, in the landmark case of Foster v. Neilson,
that only self-executing treaties immediately
provide rules of decision.3 The majority of
foreign relations scholars oppose expansive
classification of treaties as non-self-executing.
That opposition has recently trained on
the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v.
Texas,4 and understandably so, as Medellín
arguably eclipsed Foster as the Court’s most
important pronouncement on the domestic status of treaties and endorsed a broad
notion of non-self-execution.5
One of the ways in which scholars challenge non-self-execution is by asserting that
it violates a constitutional principle of equivalence.6 As discussed below, various arguments countering the equivalence thesis have
been offered to date. I offer a new response.
This response turns on the recognition that
all three sources of supreme federal law have
a dual nature. Treaties are primarily international agreements and secondarily domestic law. The Constitution and statutes, by
contrast, primarily function as domestic
law but also play a role in international relations, particularly when they apply extraterritorially. Comparing judicial treatment of
all three sources along their secondary axis
reveals that treaties receive not just equivalent treatment but better treatment than at
least statutes even under a broad notion of
non-self-execution. This novel comparison
thus lends support to the doctrine of nonself-execution.
I

The Equivalence Thesis and 		
Counterarguments

As noted, some scholars have opposed
broad classification of treaties as non-selfexecuting on the grounds that it violates
a constitutional requirement of equivalent
treatment. The Supremacy Clause designates
the Constitution, statutes, and treaties as
supreme federal law.7 In doing so, the argument goes, the Supremacy Clause requires
equivalent treatment of all three sources.
Defenders of non-self-execution have
responded, in effect, with three principal
arguments. First, scholars have argued that
non-self-execution does not result in differential treatment. Just as treatymakers
may create something less than a judicially
enforceable treaty, those authorized to
amend the Constitution or to make statutes
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may create something less than preemptive, judicially enforceable federal law.8 For
example, statutes may “expressly eschew preemption of state law, . . . authorize states to
opt out of federal requirements, . . . and . . .
not impose binding obligations.”9 Similarly,
those with authority to enact constitutional
law have crafted constitutional provisions
with limited reach. Initially, the Constitution
was amended to add “a Bill of Rights applicable only to the federal government.”10
Second, scholars have argued based
on constitutional text, history, purpose,
and precedent that the Constitution does
not require equivalence. They note, for
example, that the Supremacy Clause fails
to address the relation of all three sources
of federal law.11 Thus, the Constitution is
superior to laws and treaties notwithstanding the fact that the Supremacy Clause
lumps all three sources together. Just as
there is no sense that the Supremacy Clause
limits the Constitution’s superior status as
the source of lawmaking and treatymaking
authority, there is no reason to believe that
the Supremacy Clause precludes authority
to enter treaties that attempt less than the
Supremacy Clause allows.12 The Supremacy
Clause explicitly binds state judges to the
Constitution, laws, and treaties in the face
of inconsistent state constitutional and
statutory law.13 This provision requires
judges to follow the dictates of the federal
Constitution, treaties, and laws, but it does
not say that these sources must dictate preemption of state law.
The Supremacy Clause’s purpose also
indicates that treaties need not receive equivalent treatment. The Constitution and statutes were included in the Supremacy Clause
to secure the domestic lawmaking supremacy of the federal government in areas of delegated authority. Treaties, by contrast, were
not included to secure another avenue of
supreme domestic lawmaking but to secure
federal foreign affairs supremacy in response
to a history of state treaty violations.14 To
the extent that non-self-execution turns, for
example, on treatymaker intent, it appears
consistent with the purpose behind inclusion in a way that similar treatment of the
Constitution and statutes might not.
Third, scholars argue that treaties’
dual nature justifies differential treatment.
Treaties not only function as domestic law,

they also play a role in foreign relations.15
Indeed, they are primarily instruments of
foreign affairs and secondarily domestic law.
A treaty cannot exist without consent from
a foreign sovereign. The inclusion of treaties
in Article II, rather than Article I, highlights
the international nature of treaties. Article
II addresses executive power and does not
speak expressly of legislative authority.16
The dual view of treaties has also been confirmed by the Supreme Court as recently as
Medellín.17 Treaties’ dual nature as instruments of foreign affairs and domestic law
produces a variety of differences between
statutes and treaties. For example, treaties often use broad terminology to extract
consent from global diversity.18 This terminology and the concepts it reflects may not
readily cohere with u.s. law, the operation of
the u.s. legal system, or typical u.s. terminology, “even when the policies of the treat[y]
are otherwise [consistent] with u.s. law.”19
These differences, the argument goes, justify differential treatment and, in particular,
less judicial enforcement of treaties than is
afforded statutes.20
II

An Expanded Duality

The dual nature of treaties, upon which
this final argument relies, has been widely
acknowledged and is not particularly controversial.21 The controversy results from
reliance on treaty duality to undercut the
equivalence thesis and support non-selfexecution.22
This article accommodates concern for
the exclusive reliance on treaty duality, at
least partially, by taking treaty duality only
as a starting point. The article goes further
to introduce, and build on, the duality of
the Constitution and statutes. Given the
inordinate focus on treaty duality, the dual
nature of the Constitution and statutes has
been overlooked in the self-execution debate.
Treaties are not the only source of law that
affects international affairs.
Statutes affect foreign relations in many
ways. At one extreme, statutes applied within
u.s. territory can have foreign relations
impact even when applied to u.s. nationals.
Statutes of this type might include the federal
death penalty, which generates opposition
from abolitionist countries.23 Other statutes
have an even more direct impact: namely,

statutes that specifically target foreign nationals—such as immigration laws24—or that
authorize or command foreign actions by
u.s. officials.25 Arguably, statutes that regulate not only actions at home but actions
abroad, especially the acts of foreign nationals, are prototypical of statutes’ secondary,
foreign affairs role.26 Such statutes are not
uncommon; the United States has regulated
foreign activity through inter alia, antitrust,
securities, copyright, trademark, intellectual
property, bankruptcy, tax, corporate, criminal, labor, civil rights, and environmental
law.27 The extraterritorial expansion of u.s.
law has, unsurprisingly, been met with opposition from foreign states.28
With regard to the Constitution, a similar spectrum exists. Constitutional limitations on domestic regulation of domestic
conduct, such as limitations on regulation

III A New Comparative Axis
Given the dual nature of the Constitution,
statutes, and treaties, domestic judicial
treatment of these sources might be compared along several axes. Critics of non-selfexecution compare the judicial treatment of
these sources in their domestic roles.35 This
assessment involves either comparing two
things (constitutional and statutory law)
that do not possess a dual nature (if one is
unpersuaded by the prior section) with one
(treaty law) that does, or comparing three
things that have a dual nature but comparing the treatment of two sources (the
Constitution and statutes) in their primary
function and a third (the treaty) in its secondary function.
The latter approach is better than comparing the treatment of all three sources

Constitution, statutes, and treaties in their
areas of secondary application is a matter of
domestic law.40
IV Treatment of the Constitution, 		
Statutes, and Treaties in Their Areas
of Secondary Application
The comparison is also timely as the
Supreme Court has recently issued relevant
opinions for each source of law. The Court’s
most recent foray into the extraterritorial41
application of the Constitution occurred
in Boumediene v. Bush,42 in which the Court
concluded that aliens detained as enemy
combatants at Guantánamo Bay “have the
constitutional privilege of habeas corpus,
a privilege not to be withdrawn except in
conformance with the Suspension Clause.”43
In Medellín v. Texas, the Supreme Court

N E I T H E R C O N G R E S S I N E N A C T I N G S TAT U T E S
NOR THE CONSTITUTION IS CONFINED IN U.S. COURTS
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of hate speech, can produce foreign relations issues. In ratifying the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for
example, the United States entered a reservation, refusing to assume an obligation
to prohibit “advocacy of national, racial or
religious hatred that constitutes incitement
to discrimination, hostility or violence”29
insofar as such a prohibition would contravene constitutional (and statutory) free
speech protections.30 The scope of government actors’ constitutional authority both
to make decisions related to foreign affairs31
and to take actions outside u.s. territory32
also bears heavily on foreign relations. The
scope of constitutional protections available to aliens likewise affects our relations
with others.33 Numerous foreign and international officials, for instance, filed amicus
briefs in support of the Guantánamo detainees in Boumediene v. Bush.34 Indeed, at the
heart of the Constitution’s secondary role
seems to lie the question whether constitutional limits constrain federal conduct outside u.s. territory.

in their foreign affairs applications. In the
foreign affairs arena, the relevance of constitutional limits and statutes is governed
by domestic law. While international law
certainly addresses states’ authority to act in
certain ways and, in particular, to apply their
law outside their borders,36 neither Congress
in enacting statutes37 nor the Constitution38
is confined in u.s. courts by the dictates of
international law. Thus, domestic law controls the extraterritorial roles of statutes
and constitutional constraints. By contrast,
the United States recognizes that treaties,
at least in their extraterritorial legal dimension, are governed by international law,
which defines such things as what qualifies as a treaty, how treaties are formed and
terminated, and rights upon breach.39 The
comparison of the Constitution, statutes,
and treaties in their foreign affairs roles thus
mixes bodies of law.
Comparing judicial treatment of the
Constitution, statutes, and treaties in
their areas of secondary application avoids
this problem. The legal treatment of the

handed down its most important decision
on the domestic status of treaties in roughly
200 years, and perhaps ever.44 The Medellín
Court assessed whether u.s. treaty commitments in relation to the International Court
of Justice (icj) were self-executing, rendering icj judgments preemptive, judicially
enforceable federal law.45 Endorsing a broad
notion of non-self-execution,46 the Court
concluded that the relevant treaty obligations were not self-executing.47 And, while
there has long been uncertainty regarding
how to ascertain the extraterritorial reach of
statutes, with divergent views in the literature and even in Court precedent, two relatively recent cases arguably provide a general
framework: Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California48 and F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd.
v. Empagran s.a.,49 both of which addressed
application of u.s. antitrust law beyond u.s.
borders.
A comparison of the judicial treatment afforded the Constitution, statutes,
and treaties in their area of secondary
application in Boumediene, Hartford Fire,
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Hoffmann-La Roche, and Medellín reveals
that statutes fare the worst. While the
intent of the relevant lawmakers surfaces
in the treatment of each source, the analysis of intent, and particularly the relation
of intent to functional considerations, differs with each, leading to differing levels of
judicial discretion to enforce the law in its
area of secondary application.
1. Judicial Treatment of the Constitution. In
Boumediene, the Court attempted to identify the original intent behind constitutional
habeas; only when that attempt failed did
the Court conduct its functional analysis.
On these facts, one might conclude that the
Court assigns a dominant role to original
intent in constitutional extraterritoriality.
That role, however, may be more formal
than real.
The majority could have grounded its
decision in original intent, perhaps supplemented by functional considerations.50 The

dence of original intent.53 Its discussion
of precedents that engaged in functional
analyses suggests that the functional test
may be the primary means for determining
constitutional reach rather than a secondary
approach to be taken only in the face of an
indiscernible original intent.
Unbound by original intent, the functional analysis gives the Court significant
discretion to determine the reach of constitutional limitations.54 In (at least recent) historical context where the judiciary generally
has given the Constitution limited extraterritorial scope, the discretion tends to expand
the Constitution’s foreign role.55 Relatedly,
the discretion ensures a prominent role for
the judiciary in fixing the Constitution’s
reach. The Boumediene Court made that fact
explicit in rejecting the government’s formalist approach to the reach of habeas partially
on separation of powers grounds, arguing
that the government’s formal, de jure sov-

in identifying the domestic effect of treaties.
The Medellín Court relied, in small part, on
express evidence of the treatymakers’ intent
regarding self-execution.58 This reliance may
have resulted from the availability of evidence directly on point, in which case the
difference between Medellín and Boumediene
may not be in their commitment to intent,
but rather in the scope of evidence available
to identify intent.
However, Medellín attempted to tether
its analysis to intent—even when invoking functional considerations—in a way
that Boumediene did not. Like Boumediene,
Medellín focused on functional considerations, such as the practical consequences of
treating icj judgments as judicially unassailable federal law.59 In Medellín, however, the
functional considerations mix with, rather
than arise separate from, consideration of
the treatymakers’ intent.60 Perhaps this
was because the functional considerations
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majority’s conclusion that the evidence
of original intent was indefinite may have
been sincere, but it may also have been an
attempt to shunt the confines of original
intent to allow the Court to reach its own
conclusion on the scope of constitutional
habeas informed by a multifactored, functional analysis. Even in the face of originalist
uncertainty, the Court made statements to
suggest that it would not always be bound
by original intent. The Court characterized
legal commentary and settled precedent
from 1789 as potentially “instructive” in its
analysis.51 Relatedly, the Court left open the
possibility (as it had before) that the scope
of constitutional habeas has expanded since
ratification, rendering precedents from 1789
the beginning point of analysis.52 Moreover,
when the Court turned to its functional
analysis it made no attempt to cast the
analysis as an exercise in constructive intent.
Nor did it attempt, in any significant way,
to bolster its functional analysis with evi-
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ereignty limitation on habeas would allow
the President and Congress “to switch the
Constitution on or off at will” in “a striking anomaly in our tripartite system of
government.”56 Likewise, while the Court
recognized the need for deference to the
Executive with regard to the procedural and
substantive standards governing detention
of possible terrorists, the Court emphasized
the need for judicial review of detention as
well.57
Boumediene thus introduces a significant level of judicial discretion into the
Constitution’s foreign affairs role. The
political branches do not control the
Constitution’s extraterritorial reach by statute or treaty. The Court fixes that reach and
does so in light of functional considerations
that elide the restraints of more categorical
approaches based on such things as formal
sovereignty.
2. Judicial Treatment of Treaties. The intent
of the lawmakers appears to play a larger role

led to a conclusion consistent with the evidence of the treatymakers’ intent. But the
Court seems to treat both evidence of the
Executive’s and Senate’s understanding during the advice and consent process and the
functional considerations as evidence of
actual intent. Indeed, in the final sentence
of its self-execution analysis, the Court
states: “Nothing in the text, background,
negotiating and drafting history, or practice
among signatory nations suggests that the
President or Senate intended the improbable result of giving the judgments of an
international tribunal a higher status than
that enjoyed by ‘many of our most fundamental constitutional protections.’”61
In light of the coupling of evidence of
actual intent with functional considerations,
the intent identified is arguably more constructive than actual. As a result, the attempt
to tie functional considerations to intent
may be little different than the Boumediene
Court’s shunting of original intent. Yet the
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Medellín Court acknowledges some need to
ground its decision in the authority of the
lawmakers. Consequently, Medellín arguably manifests at least a marginally greater
commitment to lawmaker intent than does
Boumediene. This commitment restrains the
judiciary in classifying treaties as enforceable
domestic law.
The functional considerations that inform
the self-execution analysis also constrain—
rather than expand, as in Boumediene—judicial enforcement of treaties. The functional
considerations in Medellín reflect a separation of powers vision in which the political
branches take the lead in foreign affairs and
lawmaking.62 To illustrate, suppose that
a treaty imposed a broad obligation such
as the duty to provide due process. A court could certainly fill
such an obligation with content
as courts do in enforcing the
Constitution. 63 However, the
Medellín Court presumed that
if treaty obligations are not specifically defined, Congress did
not intend judicial enforcement
absent congressional implementation.64 The
political branches generally should fill vague
treaty obligations with content. The obligation to “undertake[ ] to comply with” icj
judgments was such an obligation.65 It did
not suggest an immediate obligation to judicially enforce judgments but a range of steps
that might be taken to implement icj decisions.66 Under Medellín’s separation of powers perspective, the political branches should
elect those steps. Although this line of thinking limits judicial enforcement of treaties,
many critics of non-self-execution agree that
treaty obligations may be non-self-executing
if they are vague.67 The Court’s other separation of powers judgments are more controversial.68
First, the Court considered whether
other parties to the relevant treaties made
icj judgments immediately enforceable in
their domestic courts.69 The absence of persuasive evidence that other states adopted
this practice supported a finding of non-selfexecution on the implicit presumption that
the political branches may, but the judiciary
should not, assume unilateral obligations on
behalf of the United States.70
Second, the judiciary should be reluctant to classify a treaty as self-executing if
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the practical consequences of doing so “give
pause.”71 Treating commitments toward
the icj as self-executing threatened the possibility of unassailable icj judgments that
preempt state and federal law and void criminal convictions and sentences.72 The Court
presumed that express election of such
consequences should be left to the political
branches,73 notwithstanding the fact that
the political branches arguably chose those
consequences in accepting the relevant treaty
obligations.74
Third, the Court should be sensitive
to the effect of self-execution on political
branch discretion and u.s. foreign relations.75 Justice Breyer’s dissenting, case-by-

case, multivariate approach to self-execution
would label a treaty self-executing in some
contexts and not in others based on a judicial
determination and would hamper the United
States’ ability to enter treaties with other
countries.76 Branding the relevant treaty
obligations self-executing would also remove
the option of deciding whether and how to
comply with icj judgments.77 Perhaps that
result would not be troubling in certain circumstances. However, international law and
the u.s. treatymakers contemplated the possibility of both noncompliance and u.s. veto
of any Security Council attempts at enforcement, and the judiciary, under Medellín’s
separation of powers, should not limit that
discretion.78
Fourth and relatedly, the relevant treaties
established international means of enforcing
treaty obligations relative to the icj.79 The
Court presumed in such circumstances that

the treatymakers would not expect the treaty
to be self-executing, obviating—at least in
some situations—the need for the contemplated international enforcement.80
As noted, each of these considerations
reflects a separation of powers in which
the judiciary takes second seat in lawmaking and foreign affairs. The considerations
fall short of establishing a formal presumption of non-self-execution. 81 Together,
however, they limit judicial opportunity
to classify a treaty as self-executing and
immediately enforceable as domestic law.82
That result, though arguably inconsistent
with Boumediene’s expansion of judicial
authority, was not accidental. In responding to Justice Breyer’s proposed analysis,
the Court emphasized the impropriety of
expanding the judiciary’s foreign affairs
and lawmaking power through selfexecution analysis.83
3. Judicial Treatment of Statutes.
Restrictions on judicial discretion to classify treaties as selfexecuting, however, are not as
severe as those on the extraterritorial application of statutes. The
ultimate determinant of statutory
extraterritoriality is congressional intent.
The Court recognizes, for example, that
Congress can apply a statute beyond the
boundaries imposed by international law.84
At the same time, the Court enlists two
canons of interpretation to fix statutes’
extraterritorial reach: the presumption
against extraterritoriality, which assumes
that Congress legislates only for u.s. territory, and the Charming Betsy canon, which
seeks a statutory interpretation that is consistent with international law.85
Application of each canon can involve
functional considerations. In United States
v. Bowman, for example, the Court found
the presumption against extraterritoriality overcome given the nature of the activity Congress sought to prohibit—conduct
easily and as likely committed abroad as
at home—and the practical consequences
of preventing the statute from reaching
the extraterritorial conduct.86 Functional
considerations inform application of the
Charming Betsy canon as well. In determining whether a particular extraterritorial
application is consistent with international
law, courts should first identify one of five

grounds recognized in international law for
exercising prescriptive jurisdiction.87 Some
of these grounds parallel functional considerations in Boumediene: whether the regulated person or activity is within the state’s
territory, whether the person regulated or
harmed is a national of the regulating government, and whether regulation is necessary to a state’s core interests, including
security interests.88
Functional considerations likewise guide
the reasonableness analysis that ensues
when a state has a basis to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction but that exercise targets “a
person or activity having connections with
another state.”89 Reasonableness may turn
on such things as whether there is a territorial link between the action or actor regulated and the regulating state, the effect of
the regulation on justified expectations, “the
extent to which another state may have an
interest in regulating the activity,” and “the
likelihood of conflict with regulation by
another state.”90 These considerations focus
on the effect of extraterritorial application
of a statute on another sovereign’s authority.91 Many of these factors track Boumediene’s
consideration of such things as the link of the
government activity regulated (i.e., apprehension and detention) to u.s. territory
and the link between the detainees and the
United States.
The considerations in the statutory
context, however, are critically different.
In Boumediene, functional considerations
supported judicial discretion to extend
the Constitution’s protections extraterritorially. In Medellín, functional considerations informed treatymaker intent. In the
statutory context, the Court has expressly
rejected “excessive reliance on functional
considerations and reconstructed congressional intent” in fixing extraterritoriality.92
Functional considerations in the statutory
context are not permissive guidelines for
the courts to decide “what Congress would
have wanted.”93 Instead, functional considerations inform whether the presumptions
against extraterritoriality and violation of
international law are overcome. These presumptions restrain both Congress and the
courts from applying statutes extraterritorially. As the Supreme Court has illustrated,
most recently in Morrison v. National Australia
Bank Ltd., the presumptions sometimes will

hold, obstructing extraterritorial application
of statutes.94 And in all cases, the presumptions will restrict judicial discretion in statutes’ area of secondary application.95
In short, the roles of lawmaker intent,
functional considerations, and ultimately
judicial discretion differ significantly in the
Constitution’s, statutes’, and treaties’ areas
of secondary application. In some cases,
original intent might control the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution. At least
when original intent is indeterminate,
however, a functional analysis ensues. The
functional analysis provides the judiciary
greater discretion to extend constitutional
limitations in foreign relations. With treaties, the analysis also focuses on intent,
but functional considerations combine
with evidence of actual intent to form a
sort of hybrid intent. These separation
of powers–inspired considerations tend
toward non-self-execution, but do not
erect a formal presumption against selfexecution. As a result, courts retain limited
but still significant discretion to enforce
treaties as domestic law. The functional
considerations bearing on the extraterritorial reach of statutes, by contrast, inform
presumptions that Congress did not intend
to regulate extraterritorially or in excess of
international law. These presumptions limit
judicial discretion to apply statutes extraterritorially. The result is that the hurdles the
Constitution and treaties face prior to judicial enforcement in their secondary areas
are flatter than the hurdles statutes must
overcome before being applied extraterritorially, notwithstanding the inclusion of all
three sources in the Supremacy Clause.
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T

he first meeting of the West
African Chapter of J. Reuben
Clark Law Society was held in
Nigeria in August 2010, bringing
the total number of international
chapters to 24 in 18 different
countries. Elder Declan O. Madu,
an Area Seventy from Owerri, in
Imo State, was named chair of
the new chapter with Ted Goh,
from Accra, Ghana, as chair-elect.
The meeting was attended by
32 lawyers, students, General
Authorities, and a justice of the
Nigerian High Court.
Elder Madu, Justice
Ikpomwem, Nigerian government
attorney Chijioke Okoro, and
Elder Adesinna J. Olukanni of the
Seventy spoke. J. Reuben Clark
Law Society international chair
Nancy Van Slooten joined the
proceedings via Skype and also
addressed the gathering. Later, at
a fireside, Elder John B. Dickson of
the Seventy, who is serving as the
first counselor in the Africa West
Area presidency, spoke.

Van Slooten pointed out benefits of membership in the Society
to the West African community.
She said that members there would
reach out, mentor each other and
younger attorneys, look for opportunities for pro bono service, and
seek to be an influence for good.
Justice Ikpomwem set down
expectations of the judiciary for
lds attorneys. He said lds lawyers
are expected to say no to all
forms of injustice and, as stated in
Amos 5:15, he or she must “hate
the evil, and love the good” to
help establish justice.
Elder Dickson said that he
believed members in the chapter
had been prepared for this day
“with unique and God-given
talents.” He said, “The Lord wants
righteous, believing, and faithful
people to stand as a light on the
hill in these trying times. We
must be some of those men and
women.”
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the spring issue of the clark
memorandum publishes news of

Class Notes

clark law school. because of
space constraints, it is not
always possible to publish every
submission for the class notes.

E-mail your professional news to copel@law.byu.edu.

class of 1976
Conrad Houser became semiretired
as president of Geovic Energy at the
end of 2010. He continues as an expert
legal witness in mining litigation and
a due diligence consultant. Pro bono
work continues to be one of his highest
priorities.
Cheryl A. Russell died August 8, 2010, in
Salt Lake City. She had served as Logan
City Justice Court judge since 1992.
class of 1977
David R. Bird was awarded the Patrick
Conner Award for his distinguished
service to the mining industry at the 95th
Annual Convention of the Utah Mining
Association. He was honored for his work
as a trusted advisor and lobbyist for
various Utah mining companies as well as
the Utah Mining Association. According
to the Utah Mining Association, Bird’s
leadership, knowledge, and close working
relationships with Utah’s government
leaders and policy makers has been a
great benefit to the mining industry for
many years. Bird, a natural resources
lawyer, has been a generous contributor
to various charities and served on the
Utah State Bar Commission and later
as president of the bar. He also served
on the Utah Foundation Board and
the Utah Manufacturers Association
board of directors.
Douglas Holt is serving his 12th year as
Graham County Superior Court judge
in Safford, Arizona. He is a member
of the Arizona Judicial Council and a
senior member of the Presiding Judges
Committee for the Arizona Judiciary.
Scott R. Jenkins was admitted to the
Utah State Bar and the u.s. District
Court, District of Utah, in 1978 and the
u.s. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit,
in 1979. He has more than 30 years of
experience advising individuals, entities,
and charitable organizations on legal
matters affecting their lives, families,
and businesses, including business
organization, public offerings, private
placements, and sec reporting.
Stephen L. Roth was unanimously
confirmed by the Utah Senate to be a
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judge on Utah’s Court of Appeals on
February 26, 2009. He has been a judge
in West Jordan since 2002 as well as
an adjunct professor at the University
of Utah.
class of 1981
Charlene Barlow has been appointed to
the Third Judicial District Court, which
serves Salt Lake, Summit, and Tooele
Counties. Prior to her appointment
she served as the section chief of the
Criminal Division of the Utah Attorney
General’s Office, as the Provo City
attorney, as the Orem City attorney,
and as a prosecutor in the Utah County
Attorney’s Office.
Glade Myler spoke on February 26, 2010,
in Logan, Utah, as part of the College of
Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences
Distinguished Alumni Speakers Series at
Utah State University. He is a senior
deputy attorney general in Carson
City, Nevada. Myler mainly practices
administrative law, including emergency
management and homeland security for
the state of Nevada.
class of 1982
Kenneth M. Anderson has joined Locke
Lord Bissell & Liddell as a partner based
in the firm’s Houston, Texas, office. He
was formerly Vinson & Elkins’ syndicated
finance practice group chair. His practice
expertise is in energy finance.
M. James “Jim” Brady, former Mapleton
City mayor, was confirmed by the Utah
Senate as a judge of the Fourth District
Court. He has been a partner in the
Provo law firm Bradford & Brady for the
past 24 years.
Stephen Mikita, Utah assistant attorney
general, recently joined the board of
directors of the Spinal Muscular Atrophy
Foundation with four other experienced
business, media, and law leaders. sma
works to find a cure for Spinal Muscular
Atrophy.
Monte J. Stiles was honored November
17, 2010, by the Idaho State Bar with
its Professionalism Award. Stiles has
served as a federal prosecutor for the
u.s. Attorney’s Office in Idaho since

1987. From 1982 to 1987 he worked
for the Ada County Prosecutor’s
Office in Boise.
Kevin J Worthen was called as an
Area Seventy in the April 2010 general
conference of The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints.

counsel for the software distributing
company BitTorrent.
William Tilleman has worked on the
Canada Energy Commission and has
been a visiting professor at Harvard
in addition to having other legal
assignments. He is a federal justice for
the Queen’s Bench of Alberta.

class of 1983
class of 1988
Dane O. Leavitt, of Cedar City, Utah,
was called as an Area Seventy in the
April 2010 general conference of The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints.
D. James Tree is mentioned in a Yakima,
Washington, newspaper article for
mentoring his son-in-law in the state’s
law clerk program. Students like Tree’s
relative and paralegal, Tim Anderson,
can take the bar without attending law
school. Tree spends five to six hours a
week in this work. His main legal practice
is in disability law.

Dan Curriden has accepted an
in-house counsel position with aaa
of Northern California, Nevada, and
Utah. As of 2011 he and his wife have
three next-generation Cougars at
the Y and look forward to seeing a
lot more of Provo.
Robert N. Johnson, an immigration
attorney, joins as a shareholder the
Atlanta, Georgia, offices of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell &
Berkowitz.
class of 1989

class of 1984
David Lynch has recently been
appointed chair of the Department
of Criminal Justice at Weber State
University in Ogden, Utah.
class of 1985
Peter A. Thompson was appointed to
the Maricopa County Superior Court
by Arizona governor Jan Brewer. He
currently is serving as a Maricopa
County Superior Court commissioner in
Phoenix.

David McGrath is a senior vice president
and managing legal counsel for Zions
First National Bank.
class of 1990
Matthew Bryan spoke at the aba
Intellectual Property Law Conference in
Washington, d.c. He works in Geneva,
Switzerland, as the director of the Patent
Cooperation Treaty Division of the World
Intellectual Property Organization. Over
140 countries are parties to the pct,
which is an agreement for international
cooperation in the field of patents.

class of 1986
class of 1991
Sherene T. Dillon was appointed by
Utah governor Gary R. Herbert to the
Second District Juvenile Court (covering
Davis, Morgan, and Weber Counties).
She is currently with Utah’s Office of
the Guardian Ad Litem. She will take
office after being confirmed by the
Utah State Senate.
Mitch Edwards is headphone company
Skullcandy’s new chief financial officer
and general counsel in Park City, Utah.
He previously was cfo and general

Michael F. Krieger ran with the bulls in
Pamplona, finished his sixth marathon,
and had one of his sons graduate from
high school and enroll at byu. Mike has
enjoyed growing the ip practice at Kirton
& McConkie and is a little nervous about
what life will be like as an empty nester.
Kumen Taylor is a partner with
Hutchison & Steffen at its Bountiful,
Utah, office. He practices primarily in the
areas of civil and commercial litigation

and also litigates cases involving
employment and real estate law.
Erin Lee Truman is now of counsel to
Hutchison & Steffen at its Las Vegas
office. Erin is a trial lawyer and will
head Hutchison & Steffen’s Alternative
Dispute Resolution Department, which
includes both mediation and arbitration.
class of 1994
Gary Bryner, a political science
professor and former Law School adjunct
professor at byu, died March 10, 2010.
He graduated from the Law School while
teaching at byu.
Lauralyn Cabanilla is an attorney,
member of the Provo City Council, and
a lieutenant colonel in the u.s. Army
Reserves. She will be going to Iraq in
August to serve in the military.
Michael Rawlins has joined the law
firm Durham Jones & Pinegar (djp).
Michael is a shareholder in the firm’s
Las Vegas office, doing commercial
litigation, construction and mechanic’s
lien litigation, real estate litigation,
intellectual property litigation, and
representation of creditors in bankruptcy
proceedings.
Benjamin C. Stahmann was hired last
month by Oklahoma State University
Foundation in Stillwater, Oklahoma,
to serve as its senior director of
gift planning. His prior work was as
director of tax and legal services with
the National Boy Scouts of America
Foundation in Irving, Texas.
Christopher L. Thomas joined
the Denver office of the labor and
employment law firm Ogletree, Deakins,
Nash, Smoak & Stewart as a shareholder.
He and three others formerly with the
immigration practice group of Holland
& Hart in Denver will serve as their
new firm’s immigration practice
group for the western United States.
Christopher was a partner at Holland
& Hart.
class of 1996
Martin W. Bates was appointed the new
superintendent of Granite School District
in Salt Lake City, starting September
1, 2010. He most recently was the
assistant superintendent in the district
over administrative and legal services.
Martin has served as an assistant to the
superintendent since 1999 and in other
district administrative capacities since
1997. Granite is the largest district in
Utah, with 89 schools, 3,000 teachers,
and 68,400 students.
David Moore, a byu law professor,
was the main participant in an online
symposium sponsored by the Virginia
Journal of International Law. He discussed
his recent essay in vjil: “Medellin, the
Alien Tort Statute, and the Domestic
Status of International Law.” David’s
essay looks at the u.s. Supreme Court
case Medellin v. Texas and its impact on

the Alien Tort Statute in the context
of how treaties are considered in
American law.

senior counsel, Jeff works with energy,
finance, transactional, and securities law.
class of 2003

class of 1997
James E. Lake, a patent lawyer,
joined the ip law firm Zarian, Midgley
& Johnson in Boise and Spokane.
He was a shareholder at Wells
St. John in Spokane.
Elizabeth Sewell has been published
in a coauthored casebook, Law and
Religion: Cases in Context (Aspen
Publishers Legal Education, 2010).
The book is edited by Leslie C. Griffin
of the University of Houston and has
sections by 14 coauthors. Elizabeth is
currently associate director at the
International Center for Law and Religion
Studies at J. Reuben Clark Law School.
class of 1998
Richard C. Blake was named a partner
at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati
in Palo Alto, California, specializing
in private and public offerings, public
company representation, mergers and
acquisitions, and corporate governance
counseling.
Dane Watkins Jr. has been elected
to serve as a judge for the Seventh
Judicial District in Idaho. His service
on the bench follows nine years as the
Bonneville County prosecuting attorney.
class of 1999
Paul C. Farr was appointed by Herriman
City to be its new justice court judge.
Paul has been a partner with the law
firm Morgan, Minnock, Rice & James
in downtown Salt Lake City. He lives in
Herriman, Utah.
Sarah Leeper was recently elected as a
partner with the law firm Manatt, Phelps
& Phillips llp. Sarah works in the firm’s
San Francisco office, where her practice
focuses on representing water, energy,
and telecommunications companies
in matters before the California Public
Utilities Commission, fcc, and ferc.
Sarah is married to Steven Egli, and they
reside in Mill Valley, California.
Matt Martinez, an immigration attorney,
was recently elected a shareholder at the
Phoenix law firm Fennemore Craig.
class of 2000
Patrick Malone has joined Barrick Gold
of North America as senior counsel.
Clate Mask, the current president of
Infusionsoft, was recently interviewed
on a business blog by entrepreneur
Sramana Mitra.
class of 2001
Jeffrey R. “Jeff” Atkin was elected
partner last week by the law firm Foley
& Lardner in Los Angeles. A former

Chad B. Balfanz was promoted to
major in the u.s. Army Judge Advocate
General’s Corps. He previously taught
constitutional law at West Point.
Chad and his family currently reside
in Charlottesville, Virginia, where he
is pursuing an llm in international
law. His wife, Cathy, gave birth to their
third child, Tristan Chad Balfanz, in
November 2010.
Michael P. Brooks is director of byu’s
University Accessibility Center and
president of the Utah Chapter of the
Association on Higher Education and
Disability (ahead). He was recently
appointed as chair for the Disability
Issues Advisory Committee at byu.
A licensed psychologist, Michael will
become an associate clinical professor
in the Counseling and Career Center.
Edward L. Carter was a newspaper
reporter before he went to law school
and clerked for Judge Aldisert of the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Edward
currently is an assistant communications
professor and serves as the associate
department chair of the Department of
Communications at byu.

and Burbidge Mitchell & Gross, working
exclusively in commercial litigation.
Lorianne Updike Toler found a
previously unknown copy of the u.s.
Constitution in November 2009
while researching at the Historical
Society of Pennsylvania.
class of 2006
Paul S. Holdaway has become a
shareholder of the intellectual property
firm Wells St. John ps after four years
as an associate attorney. His patent
practice is focused on electrical and
software technologies and includes
client and inventor counseling,
application preparation, and prosecution
of applications before the United States
Patent and Trademark Office.
Daniel C. Swinton has been elected
as president of the Association for
Student Conduct Administration (asca).
The association has approximately
1,700 members at over 700 colleges
and universities nationwide. Daniel is
currently assistant dean of students and
director of student conduct and academic integrity at Vanderbilt University.
He and his wife, Julia, live in Nashville,
Tennessee, with their three children;
they are expecting their fourth in May.
class of 2008

class of 2004
Carolyn E. Howard was profiled in the
Salt Lake Tribune, emphasizing her good
work with students at Utah Valley
University in Orem, Utah.
Carolina Núñez has just published an
article that is now available on ssrn:
“Fractured Membership: Deconstructing
Territoriality to Secure Rights and
Remedies for the Undocumented Worker,”
Wisconsin Law Review, 2010.
class of 2005
Ryan Bellows was a Twenty Under 40
Award winner on November 4, 2010.
These annual awards are given by the
Reno Gazette-Journal “to exceptional
business leaders under 40 years of age
who work in the Greater Reno-Tahoe
[Nevada] market.”
Ronald K. Fuller is the 2010 recipient
of the LexisNexis John R. Johnson
Memorial Scholarship, given to a law
school graduate pursuing a library school
degree. The scholarship was announced
at the American Association of Law
Libraries annual meeting in Denver,
Colorado. Ronald currently is an assistant
librarian and adjunct professor of law
at the S. J. Quinney Law Library at the
University of Utah in Salt Lake City.
Rob Mooney has started his own firm in
Salt Lake City, the Law Office of Robert P.
K. Mooney pllc, focusing on commercial
litigation. Rob prepared to open his
practice by working under the trial
lawyers at Holme Roberts & Owen llp

Michelle Bushman is the lead author of
a new geological study about a desert
oasis near Death Valley, California. Her
study looks at where the water comes
from that flows out of the ground at
Ash Meadows, Nevada, about 90
miles northwest of Las Vegas on the
California/Nevada border. The water
feeds about 22,000 acres of wetlands
in the middle of the desert at the
oasis, which is home to the largest
concentration of endemic life in a local
area in the country. The study concludes
that the water comes from the area of
the Nevada Test Site, not from other
areas as previously assumed. Michelle
is an attorney with Ford & Huff in Lehi,
Utah. She received both a master of
science degree and a jd at byu in 2008.
class of 2009
Benjamin Kearns has joined the law
firm Best, Best & Krieger in their Ontario,
California, office. He previously worked at
the firm as a summer associate in 2008.
Tyler V. Snow has joined the law firm
Christensen & Jensen. He concentrates
his practice on product liability,
insurance defense, commercial litigation,
and personal injury.
David Stott has published an article that
was originally a paper in the law school
class “Joseph Smith and the Law,” taught
by Professor Jack Welch. David was an
associate at Cravath, Swaine & Moore in
New York City prior to now clerking for a
federal judge, also in New York.
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2011: A Year for
Milestone Anniversaries
of the Law School
Anniversaries remind us of the shoulders we stand on and of our obligation to
make today something worth celebrating in the future.

140th

35th

anniversary
–––––

40th

anniversary
–––––
The first announcement
of J. Reuben Clark
Law School was on
March 9, 1971,
when Harold B. Lee,
president of The
Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints,
made known both the
building of a new
law school at byu and
the retirement
of then byu president
Ernest L. Wilkinson.

The first graduating
class of byu
Law School received
jd diplomas
on April 18, 1976.

anniversary
–––––
The birth of J. Reuben
Clark Jr. was on
September 1, 1871, in
Grantsville, Utah.

50th

anniversary
–––––
The death of
J. Reuben Clark Jr.
was on October
6, 1961, in Salt Lake
City, Utah.
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